Proposals like DANE, using TLSA records, or deploying SSHFP records on DNSSEC enabled domains, are a different kettle of fish.
Whether or not you believe in DANE really depends on whether you're willing to accept that the DNS infrastructure is already security critical. Truth be told, if I can hijack your DNS, I can get a certificate for your domain using simple domain validation... but that's true of your web server as well. There's no easy answer here.
I use my own cache, not shared with anyone. Do I really need to worry about snooping?
I also use CurveDNS with the authoritative server that serves my version of the root.zone.
Practicing my CurveDNS skills for that day when more authoritative servers are using curvedns. Not sure that day will ever come.
I interpreted this to mean encrypting each DNS packet.
Maybe I misread the statement?
DNSSEC of course does not protect the contents of the packet.
Instead, DNSSEC more or less is just another CA system (or an adjunct to the existing one), running over UDP.