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Re:Web's random numbers are too weak, researchers warn by aidenn0 on Sunday August 09, 2015 @12:09PM (#10030555)
Perhaps you can clear something up: my understanding is that linux /dev/urandom will drain the entropy pool first and then use a CSPRNG when it is empty.

This is what I was told back in the 2.6 days, and it always seemed to me that you would want to stretch your entropy out more.

Re:Web's random numbers are too weak, researchers warn by tptacek on Sunday August 09, 2015 @12:17PM (#10030570)
That has never been true, but it is for reasons passing understanding a very popular urban legend.

/dev/random and /dev/urandom use the same CSPRNG code. There are only two differences: there are separate state pools for them, and /dev/random includes logic to block on requests that exceed an estimator number.

Re:Web's random numbers are too weak, researchers warn by Tomte on Sunday August 09, 2015 @12:22PM (#10030591)
And to make it even more clear: the notion that /dev/urandom first does "the right thing" and then (after entropy has been exhausted) falls back on the "worthless thing" (the CSPRNG) is absolutely and categorically wrong.

Both /dev/urandom and /dev/random always do "the worthless thing".

What people consider "the right thing", namely handing out raw collected random bits without any postprocessing, would even be catastrophic.