Re:Web's random numbers are too weak, researchers warn
by kaesve on Sunday August 09, 2015 @08:22AM
(#10030134)
As far as I could see, it's not a problem in the CSPRNG itself, but in how it is used. More specifically it seems like a lot of applications use more entropy bits per second than servers generate by normal use. I'd say this is the result of not understanding how CSPRNG works and how to use it safely. Adding more or better sources of entropy to your systems would solve this.
Re:Web's random numbers are too weak, researchers warn
by pedrocr on Sunday August 09, 2015 @08:48AM
(#10030177)
>I'd say this is the result of not understanding how CSPRNG works and how to use it safely.
My take from previous discussions is that once you seed a CSPRNG properly you can take secure random numbers from it forever. So in a linux server once /dev/urandom has been properly seeded you can take random numbers from it forever with no issues.
So if what they discovered in this research is that "Linux's /dev/urandom entropy pool often runs empty on servers" this shouldn't really be much of an issue.
Re:Web's random numbers are too weak, researchers warn
by sarciszewski on Sunday August 09, 2015 @10:04AM
(#10030311)
So it's, once again, an issue where cloud servers aren't being seeded before their keys are generated?
Re:Web's random numbers are too weak, researchers warn
by tedunangst on Sunday August 09, 2015 @10:55AM
(#10030411)
OpenBSD does not allow entropy to be "used up".
Re:Web's random numbers are too weak, researchers warn
by sarciszewski on Sunday August 09, 2015 @02:02PM
(#10030878)
Yeah, and the concept of "entropy can be used up" is stupid. :)
I thought maybe this was a flaw in the PRFs used in Linux, for example.
I wonder if OpenBSD's arc4random_buf() is unaffected?
cc 'tptacek :)