We don't have any mechanism other than trusting Whisper Systems that their client binaries matches the sources.
The truly paranoid could be their own client application from source.
And I'm not interested in the client side, but in the server side of the security. I assume I can rebuild the client using the sources and compare their client with my build.
What I can't assume is that their servers aren't, for example, infested by some state security malware which takes over the control. I want the protocols that work even when the server is subverted.
There are that are working on eliminating the need for central server for message delivery and key server roles like
https://whispersystems.org/blog/asynchronous-security/
"At registration time, the TextSecure client preemptively generates 100 signed key exchange messages and sends them to the server. We call these “prekeys.” A client that wishes to send a secure message to a user for the first time can now: - Connect to the server and request the destination’s next “prekey.”" Etc.
How is this not giving the server chance to insert its own keys and not the ones user generated?
What the QR code thing is actually doing? From what I understand, the TextSecure/Signal in one way or another send your contacts to the server and the server stores "prekeys" and delivers them to the clients. Where is any analysis that says that all this stuff doesn't mean that we have to trust that the server is not evil?
If the QR code means "yes it's the person you want to communicate to" but the contacts are on the server and the prekeys are delivered from the server, am I any better?
I need to read somewhere that the server is not weak point and why it is not. Any link?
Because the server can't sign the key exchange messages - the private key is generated on the client and never leaves it.
The protocol "safe from the server turning malicious" would also be good even if I'd run my own server to prevent Text Secure servers getting all the contacts.
It's possible for the server to hand out the wrong key for a user, but the clients detect that. There are other ways for users to mount impersonation attacks without server cooperation anyway.
The server also knows who talks to who, when, how big those messages are, and the number of attachments and their sizes. An adversary who can passively watch the server's encrypted traffic will also be able to determine some of these things, but not as easily or precisely.
All the TextSecure server is really trusted to do is a good job of confirming a user who purports to have a certain phone number really does control that number at registration time.
But that's how it is with any system. Even with PKI you're just trusting a different server. At least it's possible for you to check your contact's fingerprint out of band if you're really concerned.
You need the TextSecure server because without it you're not going to be able to connect to your contact at all. When everyone's moving between different connections to the internet and is almost always behind NAT then communication is only practical with a server.
There's nothing stopping anyone from exchanging messages directly over TCP sockets. It would totally work. But how practical is that? How will anyone initiate a connection to your cell phone?
That would mean that checking the open sources they publish doesn't help as we don't know what they actually do on the server side.
Now I'd very much like to be proven wrong, so if anybody knows any independent work that claims that the protocols are made so that what's on the server doesn't matter, please post and I thank you in advance.
Also, does anybody know if the sources they publish are enough to make the fully independent infrastructure (run own servers)?