Re:Crema: A Sub-Turing Programming Language
by qznc on Wednesday August 05, 2015 @01:17PM
(#10011281)
Are there also language-based approaches to defend against timing attacks? Are there languages which zero buffers/variables after use?
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Re:Crema: A Sub-Turing Programming Language
by vilhelm_s on Wednesday August 05, 2015 @02:26PM
(#10011757)
There has been some work on language-based mitigation of timing channels, e.g. http://www.cs.cornell.edu/andru/papers/pltiming.html and http://www.cse.chalmers.se/~russo/publications_files/ESORICS... .
Re:Crema: A Sub-Turing Programming Language
by schoen on Wednesday August 05, 2015 @01:21PM
(#10011305)
I don't think those topics have been addressed in LANGSEC (although it might be easier to examine all the possible timing properties of code in a non-Turing-complete environment).
An approach to the second topic is described in
https://www.usenix.org/legacy/event/sec05/tech/full_papers/c...
Re:Crema: A Sub-Turing Programming Language
by qznc on Wednesday August 05, 2015 @01:50PM
(#10011511)
Thanks! The paper is interesting, but not language-based. They change runtime (more precisely libc-free) and kernel.
I was thinking about something different. In C++ you could create a wrapper type (similar to smart pointers) which zeros on deallocation. However, there is the problem that the compiler could optimize the zeros away, because nobody reads those writes. So you really need language/compiler support to do this correctly and future-proof.