Or, in short: never use ForwardAgent (or ssh -A) to a server you don't trust.
Sometimes I feel just so awed at the ingenuity of people, especially with software and computers.
Also, I used to add every jump combination into my .ssh/config file, but came across a wonderful trick that makes it unnecessary: https://en.wikibooks.org/wiki/OpenSSH/Cookbook/Proxies_and_J...
Ex.:
Host bastion.company
ProxyCommand none
Host *.company
ProxyCommand ssh -W %h:%p bastion.companyA socket that allows dumping the keys isn't really an improvement. If the box is compromised, agent forwarding can still be abused.
> seems much more secure.
Emphasis on "seems".
You can find it at: https://github.com/ccontavalli/ssh-ident
(This is on the Cinnamon desktop, so other GNOME setups could be different.)
[1] See https://askubuntu.com/questions/63407/where-are-startup-comm... for how to override in your user dir, or find it in the GUI somewhere. [2] https://launchpad.net/ssh-askpass-keyring is the Ubuntu page
Holy mother of god, can we somehow return to the time when almost nobody used *nix and Microsoft was the one struggling to keep systems of these people secure?
It amazes me that people enable that for random servers. Seems like SSH should make that harder. Enabling it for a specific server you trust makes sense; enabling it for all servers doesn't. SSH could reject "ForwardAgent" outside a Host block, for instance, and force you to at least write a "Host *" block.
EDIT: Check out this search: https://github.com/search?utf8=%E2%9C%93&q=ForwardAgent&type...