throwaway59229

Modern TVs (anything that doesn’t have an analogue-only path all the way to the display, which is probably almost every TV sold in the last 10-15 years) are designed in a way that (unintentionally) disregards the importance of predictable signal-to-visibility delays.

Basically this is because all modern displays have a digital path from their (primarily digital) inputs which always (even if it’s “disabled”) includes signal processing to convert the incoming signal (of varying resolutions, refresh rates, color spaces, etc.) to signal(s) which can be sent to the LCD (either through the TCON embedded in the side of the LCD or through some custom ASIC that directly generates the analogue waveforms to drive the matrix of Liquid Crystals), backlight driver(s) (because artificially-measured contrast ratio numbers can be seriously enhanced for marketing), audio outputs, etc.

That’s on top of the extra image processing features that many TV’s advertise (“smooth motion”, “200hz”, etc.) which generally require the video DSP to buffer one or more frames to perform the processing (and maybe generate intermediate frames). These additional features can often be disabled by enabling a “gaming mode” which is (usually) designed to reduce perceptible input latency but this is not always implemented correctly by the manufacture and most reviewers don’t perform end-to-end latency measurements so there’s not much incentive for manufacturers to do much better than “ok”.

Analogue-only CRT TVs didn’t have nearly the same complexity (or features) in their signal processing and could reliably be trusted to display a given input with a minimal delay, mostly due to the fact that they didn’t have any (significant) form of memory to buffer signals for processing.

If I recall correctly, there was an era in analogue broadcast where the signal that was generated in the studio broadcast camera became the synchronisation signal for every TV that was tuned to that channel which essentially means that a TV tuned into that broadcast would actually scan the electron beam across the CRT at exactly the same rate and time as all the other TVs on the same channel. This required careful signal design to ensure that a “cheap” TV with poor timekeeping could still synchronise its operation with the incoming signal but it was far more practical/affordable than trying to buffer an entire frame given the technology at the time.

To answer your question directly, it might allow you to have synchronised broadcast to multiple TV’s but it may require playing with the output resolution/refresh rates of your OpenHD receiver and with the settings on the TV (try looking for a “gaming” picture preset).

Why did Google choose to fork QEMU?

I had a brief look at the setup information and there’s nothing that makes it clear why there’s yet another piece of highly Google-specific (though presumably open source) software that people would need to learn to use while they learn about Fuschia.

I have been reading through the proposed law (see my posts elsewhere in this thread) and I have to say that I disagree with your assessment that the law implies or requires targetting of specific individuals or groups rather than dragnet-style operations. Unfortunately, there doesn't seem to be anything in the bill to limit the scope of a TCN/TAN so that the government agencies can't use a single request to cover a wide range of unrelated cases/investigations. As it is written, it seems that a TCN/TAN could require that a company builds and signs arbitrary code that is handed to them by a government agency. [1] This code would be the backdoor (or Remote Access Tool or whatever they choose to they call it) and likely would be distributed as a software update (possibly also by the company although there might be some legal wrangling about whether the government might be required to host the backdoored software themselves).

What this all means is that a single TCN could theoretically be issued to cover a specific case (say a reasonable investigation into some potential terrorist activity) but the signed backdoor/remote access tool that comes out of it could be used arbitrarily by the agencies involved with little to no oversight.

I know that this is a difficult area for law-enforcement to operate in and I understand that part of the problem that they have at the moment is that they sometimes have no certainty about whether they can get access to specific pieces of electronic evidence (even with a warrant) but the intelligence community (including here in Australia) has a lot of bridges to build if they want to actually have this discussion in a rational manner.

There are probably some reading this who think that I am being hysterical or paranoid about ASIO/ASIS/ASD and that they are rational and ethical actors, but I suspect that anyone who thinks that is likely under informed about their historical activities.

There is currently some international investigation into evidence of recent (in the last 15 years) potential wrongdoing [2] that the current Attorney General (who would be the individual responsible for approving these TCN/TANs) is attempting to frustrate. [3] These moves by the current federal AG are so extraordinary that a former NSW DPP (Director of Public Prosecution) and a former Victorian Appeals Court judge have stated that "[...] unlawful activity was undertaken on our behalf to improve the government’s negotiating position" and that "there is a genuine question about whether the general interests of Australians would be served by the prosecution of either person." (the whistle-blower or their lawyer). [4]

Given the evidence of poor behavior by these agencies and their apparent disregard for due process, it seems extraordinary to think that these extensive new powers could not be abused as they are currently proposed.

[1] See section 317E of the law which states that providers are required to "facilitate or assist access to software that is capable of being installed on a computer, or other equipment, that is, or is likely to be, connected to a telecommunications network" and, crucially, paragraph (f) which states that providers must "assist with the testing, modification, development or maintenance of a technology or capability"

[2] In Australia bugging East Timor during negotiations over a $40-56 billion oil deal. See http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-03-04/icj-orders-australia-t...

[3] https://theconversation.com/the-shaky-case-for-prosecuting-w...

[4] https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/top-lawyers-jump-to-...

Additionally, it doesn't seem that there's anything in the bill that would prevent any of the information gained by a TCN/TAN from being shared with Five Eyes or other governments. While this might seem reasonable in the face of an international criminal/terrorist adversary, it is fundamentally security-breaking if private root signing keys that are requested as part of a TCN/TAN can just be shared with every Five Eyes government.

That means that the Australian government could just order a company to hand over their PKI/signing infrastructure (which is generally a global system) and then forward all of this information to the US or whoever else, completely outside of any judicial oversight.

I'm sure that the governments in question will deny this, and likely state that this is not their policy, but it doesn't seem to be specifically prohibited by the law and the intelligence community doesn't have a great reputation when it comes to respecting traditional legal values and due process (e.g. the FISA court in the US)

It seems that the bill [1] is intended to make it possible for ASIO/ASIS/ASD/whoever to force Apple, etc. to share their most powerful private keys (I.E. likely the keys burnt into the ROM bootloader of iOS devices), their source code and build processes. [2]

It might appear from a cursory glance at the bill and the "Industry Assistance Factsheet" [3] that the bill would not allow for this sort of behavior (introducing backdoors), but the relevant section 317ZG of the bill only prohibits government agencies from requesting that companies build weaknesses or backdoors into their software but says nothing of the government doing the same. This is extraordinarily deceptive.

So, Apple's response (and the response of other multinationals) is likely going to be to ensure that all devices that are sold on the Australian market are sold with an Australia-only root certificate/key which they'll be forced to share with the Australian government agencies but whose compromise won't affect business in other countries.

It seems that doing business in Australia (as a multinational) is going to be like doing business in China, and no doubt there will be other countries that decide to not purchase Australian communications technology for fear of backdoors... [5]

What a fucking farce this is.

EDIT: I forgot to add that by writing the bill to allow for the above behavior, the total amount of TCNs and TANs that are required (for dragnet surveillance) is reduced substancially, and given that the only public reporting seems to be a rough yearly count, this is great for PR of a police-state as it means that only a handful of approvals have to be recorded. Also it's punishable by up to 5 years in jail if you reveal the existence of a TCN/TAN (except where required to in legal proceedings and to provide a total count of the number of TCNs/TANs received over the last >6 months).

[1] https://www.homeaffairs.gov.au/consultations/Documents/the-a...

[2] See section 317E, subparagraph (f) of the bill which states that a "communications provider must [...] assist with the testing, modification, development or maintenance of a technology or capability."

[3] https://www.homeaffairs.gov.au/consultations/Documents/indus...

[4] Section 317ZG of the bill: "a [request/notice] must not have the effect of requiring a _designated communications provider_ to implement or build a systemic weakness, or a systemic vulnerability, into form of electronic protection"

[5] https://www.cnet.com/news/australia-to-ban-huawei-from-5g-ro...

Is this something that would be worth reporting/forwarding to the manufacturers of the soap (Johnson and Johnson?). It seems that they would have a stake in preventing counterfeits of their products being sold and Amazon might be less willing to blow off complaints that come from the legal team of a multinational.

If you still have the counterfeit item and a copy of the correspondence between yourself and Amazon, it might be worth forwarding...

Edit: I realise I have responded to the wrong person. The point still stands, however.