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theomarkettos

Re:Struck by a Thunderbolt on Tuesday February 26, 2019 @10:34PM (#19260640)
We need to use an Intel Arria or Stratix FPGA due to the 'config bypass' feature we use to allow QEMU to implement its own PCIe config registers. Xilinx, Lattice and Cyclone FPGAs don't support this as far as I can tell.
Re:Struck by a Thunderbolt on Tuesday February 26, 2019 @05:02PM (#19258719)
The vulnerability applies to all DMA-capable devices (ie Thunderbolt, PCIe, wifi and NVMe chips on mobiles, on-chip peripherals like mobile basebands). Thunderbolt 3 makes drive-by attacks easier, but in principle the attack could be carried out from any DMA device (subject to practical limitations like reverse engineering of firmware). Our earlier attacks were done with PCIe and Thunderbolt 2.
Re:Struck by a Thunderbolt on Tuesday February 26, 2019 @04:58PM (#19258677)
There was actually an interesting talk on fuzzing drivers in the session before ours: https://www.ndss-symposium.org/ndss-paper/periscope-an-effec...

We're working on porting to a cheaper FPGA-on-PCIe board, but it's still ~EUR 800.

Re:Struck by a Thunderbolt on Tuesday February 26, 2019 @04:45PM (#19258575)
Author here. We don't break that prompt, however there are some problems. First is that Macs have no prompt at all, so you just need to use a device on the whitelist and you're approved.

Second, the prompt says 'you attached a thing, do you want to allow it?'. The name is often not descriptive, eg 'CalDigit TS3' in our example, so users can't tell what rights are being asked for. As we've found on mobile, when apps pop up prompts about permissions users are conditioned to agree. Also, users can be deceived by putting a sticker on the malicious device with the name on the prompt - the writing on the plastic agrees with the prompt, so the device must be legit. An attacker can also play social engineering tricks - "say 'approve' to enable fast charging" for example.

Finally, it's possible to swap out the PCIe devices behind a Thunderbolt bridge without re-prompting. We took a commercial Thunderbolt dock, removed the PCB with the dock's PCIe peripherals and replaced it with another PCIe card. Windows did not notice that the device had changed and didn't prompt again.

Re:Making sense of the alleged Supermicro motherboard attack on Friday October 05, 2018 @02:27PM (#18150494)
Post author here. That was what I was thinking of - simply overdriving the lines to drag them high or low in opposition to the 'official' driver. That's pretty much all you can do with 6 pins. I was trying not to overcomplicate the explanation, since the material is already complicated enough!

Fair point about hand soldering, however it would be more obvious to the manufacturing employees for an entire production batch to be diverted to have parts added manually than to simply sneak in another reel to the hundred on the pick and place machine.