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tbroadley

Re:Names are not type safety on Monday November 02, 2020 @07:00AM (#24967132)
I'm not sure I see how "parse, don't validate" would apply when using a newtype—would you mind explaining further?

I think the main point of this article is that newtypes aren't an application of "parse, don't validate". If you validate that user input doesn't contain XSS, then wrap it in a `SafeHtml` newtype, that's validation, not parsing. The article outlines ways that you could wrap the user input but forget to validate.

By contrast, suppose you have a type like `type SafeHtml = TextNode Text | DivNode SafeHtml | ...`. You parse the user input into a value of this type. If the parse fails, it's because the user input contained something unsafe. The article contends that it's harder to accidentally wrap an unsafe string, since you have to parse a safe HTML string to get a value of type `SafeHtml`.

(Although I'm not sure I buy that last point. With both methods you'd want to keep the `SafeHtml` type's constructors in a module and not export them. Otherwise you could wrap arbitrary text in the newtype or in the `TextNode` constructor. Both seem equally possible to me.)

Re:Names are not type safety on Sunday November 01, 2020 @09:32PM (#24964372)
Applying the author's "parse, don't validate" concept, I think you'd parse the user input into a "safe HTML" type with a definition that excluded the language features that enabled those attacks. It might not be worth writing such code for a single project, but I could get behind a library that did that.