system33-
You can’t win
I needed safety wire pliers to assemble some brake rotors. The metal in the ones I got on Amazon was softer than the metal wire they came with such that the cutting edges got little wire-sized dents in them and increasingly useless the farther I got along in the job.
Returned those afterward. Junk.
But there’s other stuff I’ve gotten from RANDOMLETTERS Amazon that’s actually holding up “ok.”
Also, Harbor Freight is a better source of ok/fine tools where you don’t need quotes around those words.
But the Internet’s make mind-share means you still have to know make.
Edit: and make lets you use make to essentially run scripts/utils. People love to abuse make for that. Can’t do that with tup.
Actually solve an actual problem, not wave a machete around cutting the government in half.
Ignoring TLS errors might mean you’re ignoring the fact your exit relay is MitM attacking you.
At least for the teams I have been on and my view of leadership, there is very little political talk.
But patriotism isn’t politics… lol. The higher you get the more “hoo rah America!” is a part of the motivational speech or report or whatever. Down here in the streets it’s just another job. Pride in the country isn’t much of a driver. At least for me.
And yeah mitigation gets you into a huge body of research that’s inconclusive on practical usability. Eg so much overhead that it’s too slow and 10 people can use a 1000 relay network and still get just 1 Mbps goodput each. Contrived example.
People need to actually be able to use the network, and the more people the better for the individual.
There’s minor things tor does, but more should somehow be done. Somehow…
I got to travel to Canada, Mexico, and Europe (from the US) for tor meetings and privacy-enhancing technology conferences.
More or less every single cell that goes through the tor network today is prioritized and scheduled by the cell scheduler I wrote.
https://community.torproject.org/relay/
Thanks for considering to run a relay.
Or if you were arguing for increasing the number of relays in a circuit, that doesn’t increase security. It’s like one of the OG tor research papers deciding on 3. Bad guy just needs the first and the last. Middle irrelevant.
I know because I work there. AMA
To protect our most sensitive communications and vulnerable communities , Tor usage should be normalized so it is common and not notable.
It’s the most popular so it gets the most attention: from academics, criminals, law enforcement, journalists, …
If “deanonymize” strictly means perform a timing attack using info you have from the beginning and end of the circuit, then by definition you’re correct.
But if you visit an identifying set of websites and/or ignore TLS errors or … they can still deanonymize you.
Completely.
Exits aren’t a part of the circuit. Ever.
The list of all relays is public knowledge by design. There’s contact information attached to relays. The big operators are known individuals and organizations. They contribute. Interact.
Which ones are actually the governments doing bad things against their citizens? It’s hard to tell? Then why do you make such claims?
Relays that observably do bad things are removed from the network all the time. Are those ones the government? Tor seemingly has a reasonable handle on the situation if that’s the case.
If the fed is doing correlation attacks, why would they run relays at all? “Just” tap the IXPs near major hubs of relays. Or heck, get data from the taps you already had. Silent and more widespread.
Pushing people away from tor potentially makes it even easier to deanonymize them, depending on the adversary model assumed.
It’s a fun mental exercise and programming problem, but that’s it IMO.
I’m sure the policy adopted, if any, depends on a number of factors such as how often cash is used and typical purchase size.
- buy a pack of gum with a counterfeit $100, get 98 real dollars back
- even with legit currency, it can throw off the drawer. Business might have a policy for cashiers to never have more than, say, $200 in the drawer. Force half of that to be your $100, and now the cashier has crippled change-making ability. Business have this policy to make them less tempting to rob and limit the damage if they are.
Volunteers run probes and earn credits. Credits can be shared and spent to run measurements of their custom design. All measurement results are public info (I’m pretty sure, it’s been a while since I did stuff with RIPE atlas).
So all that nonsense about credits and volunteering may not matter to you if the results are useful.
Something like $5.30/mo (forever). They take literal cash (as one of the options). WireGuard support. They actually do privacy, not just market it.
Edited to fix price estimate and clarify it isn’t just for the first year.