somanytta

The law is clearly not preventing vendors from selling X, its preventing them dumping it if they can't sell it.

Not sure how people can't see this difference. Preventing companies dumping or disposing of their (harmful) waste (in an unregulated manner) is pretty common practise and generally agreed upon good thing.

> How would you concretely ban such a thing?

Uhmmm, so your answer is to have to some group of people asses every item of clothing or every new brand that pops up to see if it qualifies as fast-fashion based on whether it was influenced by recent catwalk trends or whether the factory it was produced in made it too fast or efficiently. ? yikes. Not sure if you realize that just how subjective and unscalable that is.

Consider that, I want to be able to use a regular android OS, but I don't completely trust it, either its purposely malicious or just accidently going to leak info. So isolation is good in this case, its much easier to audit the mechanism of isolation rather than the whole OS.

The problem with DRM and "trusted computing" part is that it's under someone else's control, some central authority etc. From my reading of the docs on this, this is not the case with pVM, from https://source.android.com/docs/core/virtualization/security

> Data is tied to instances of a pVM, and secure boot ensures that access to an instance’s data can be controlled

> When a device is unlocked with fastboot oem unlock, user data is wiped.

> Once unlocked, the owner of the device is free to reflash partitions that are usually protected by verified boot, including partitions containing the pKVM implementation. Therefore, pKVM on an unlocked device won't be trusted to uphold the security model.

So my reading of this is that that it is under the users control, as long as they have the ability to unlock the bootloader, and reflash the device with their own images.

I'd love someone who is more knowledgeable to weigh in, but this tech, to me, doesn't seem that close to TPM/DRM type chips where there is no possibility of user control.

> Confidential computing is cool and useful when you’re the one controlling the VM, but scary when you’re the one blindly running it on your hardware

Important point.

> Hopefully this gets (publicly!) backdoored like SEV, SGX, etc

From my reading this doesn't need to be backdoored, if you have the ability to unlock the bootloader, you are not reliant on googles root of trust to be able to use this feature, you can go ahead and become your own "vendor", by signing your own images, or use your choice of vendor, then relock the bootloader and have the same security guarantees.

I'll admit this only from a cursory glance over the documentation and a vague understanding, happy to be corrected, but seems a lot of the arguments in this thread are about your first point, who has control over the OS.

I'll also add that the EU is being quite proactive in people having control over their own device, and who is their 'choice of vendor' so while I understand concerns people bring up, I'm a bit more optimistic that it can be a more useful tool than not.

It's not really a matter of need, more a matter of good hygiene.

Do you trust any modern OS not to accidently include sensitive information when it generates a crash report for an app and sends it off the some remote server in the background?

Isolation is a useful tool. In an ideal world it can be done perfectly at the OS level, but we don't live in that world.

Don't understand this, why would telcos fight against LE to provide access? Seems like the path of least resistance for them to go along with government requests, rather than something more nefarious.

Sibling post imagines an explicit threat to telcos, but there is very little threat on the other side, ie there is no incentive to stand up for their users privacy for these large bureaucratic / dysfunctional orgs, so why would they?