scottbot
Hiring a "digital humanities developer" to support humanities & social science research. Research background is a plus, and work is mostly interactive data / web stuff, with some analysis or backend work.
https://cmu.taleo.net/careersection/2/jobdetail.ftl?job=2002...
That said, the philosophers of science who originally discussed falsifiability have gone on to say its inadequate, and a huge chunk of work that's published and funded as science these days isn't strictly falsifiable.
Science is a word like any other, that we all agree on to make meaning. Right now lots of practicing scientists work on a definition that includes but isn't limited to falsifiability, but of course the great thing about it is you're welcome to decide what criteria is most comfortable to you. I like to think that the work Einstein did on Special Relativity before 1915, that wasn't mathematically distinct from Lorentz or Poincare, was scientific even though it wasn't falsifiable.
Societies formed and persisted because they were good at it, because they were a stable attractor in a larger system. We might not necessarily be able to formally describe the entire system, but our propensity towards stabilization (at the biological level, the human level, the societal level) means we can do clever things at the stability points, like develop medicines that work, design groceries which are more likely to sell certain products, and predict the outcomes of presidential elections.
Now, whether or not the explanation given for the systemic outcomes are "accurate" descriptions of the underlying mechanisms is in question here, and it's an important one, but it's not a lost cause. When Copernicus set the world in orbit, there was a big argument of whether he was providing an actual explanation of the way the world works, or just a convenient mathematical shorthand for making accurate predictions. It turned out that the most parsimonious shorthand was also (ahem) less wrong than earlier mechanistic theories. So too can historians find explanations that, if not accurate representations of underlying mechanisms, can still be explanations which fit better to systemic tendencies than earlier explanations.
Edit: Which is just saying that the blog author's point is still a useful one, whether or not we can ever achieve complete mechanical account of human activity.
My goal is to make people aware of the various stats out there, their benefits and pitfalls, and let people choose whatever is the most appropriate for their needs. Those choices need to be informed, and given that most introductory stats starts with p-values and seems to teach them wrong, that's where this post is aimed.
Regarding your aside, the universe of possible observations in a given experiment assuming 100 trials may be very different than the universe assuming trials until we run out of money, which happened to fall on 100.