reitblatt
Saying that complexity theory studies "man-made things" is like saying that chemistry studies man-made molecules. It's technically true, but it confuses the methodology with the object of study: studying particular chemicals vs the underlying laws governing them or particular models vs the underlying laws of computation.
I didn't literally call them the enemy, I put it in scary quotes as a reply to the (IMO) naive sentiment of the OP that because they're "not the CIA", they're not a legitimate target of WikiLeaks.
Please ask for clarification next time before you cathartically lecture someone based on your own misunderstanding.
"Is it not possible to profit by bribing/blackmailing a government official and benefit the public at the same time?"
The ethical content of an action is not determined by accidental effects. If I shoot a gun blindly into a street and accidentally save someone by shooting their attacker, that doesn't make my actions ethical. Bribing an official for information that you can then sell to the highest bidder is corruption. The intent matters.
"Please think these things through next time before you cathartically post that someone is "the enemy"."
I don't think that word means what you think it means.
Edit: It's in the article. Stratfor gathers information using paid informants, including government officials. That's bribery.
The real question we should be asking is whether opening and sharing these code bases will result in an increase in quality that offsets the loss of experimental independence.
They offer f-fault tolerance. They can have f nodes go down in a single "zone" and keep chugging as long as no more nodes in the same zone go down before the master reconfigures. Note that the f faults are per-zone, not per-system, so in fact many more than f nodes can be down in a single system without a problem.
But, more importantly, you seem to be confusing partition tolerance and fault tolerance. CAP is about partition tolerance: offering "CA" in the presence of arbitrary partitions. They offer a specific form of fault tolerance: "CA" in the presence of any failure or partition that affects less than f nodes.
"Handling a crashed machine counts as partition-tolerance. (Update: I was wrong about this part."
He then goes on to give Stonebraker crap about claiming that "failures" never happen, simply because he doesn't understand the difference between failures and partitions.
Look, the point of "CAP" is this: if you assume nothing about the network, then you can not guarantee CA in the presence of ARBITRARY network partitions. It doesn't say that you can't provide CA under some or even many network partition scenarios. So, the question you should be asking is "what kinds of network partitions happen in practice?". Stonebraker's point was that network partitions are such rare and wholly catastrophic events that worrying about them pulls focus away from much more practical concerns. Hyperdex' point on partition tolerance (admittedly not clearly spelled out) is much more subtle. They offer tolerance of a specific class of partitions. To simply say they are "AP" or "CP" ignores the very important fact that they do in fact tolerate partitions and maintain the CA. This whole "CAP" pick any two is a gross over-simplification that obscures very real distinctions like this.