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qazitory

Re:Ask HN: Does anyone do academic writing in their own time? on Thursday September 20, 2018 @10:52AM (#18032841)
I do this. For me it's fairly easy as I left academia and simply carried on working with former colleagues/acquaintances, in my spare time. My contribution as a %age of the overall workload has dropped, but is still meaningful.

Obvious caveats are:

* In some areas such as CS, you'll want to publish at a conference. If you submit a paper, one named author will have to agree to present it. If that has to be you, you'll have to pay the travel and registration cost for the conference.

* IP / ownership issues are big, particularly if you work for a BigCorp in a field close to that you are publishing in --- these tend to be pretty inflexible on this. I found it difficult, but not impossible at the BigCorp I worked for. I'm in a small consultancy now, and it's a breeze.

Re:How to defeat Ed25519 and EdDSA using faults on Friday October 06, 2017 @11:17AM (#15417438)
Nest products are using hash-based signatures?
Re:How to defeat Ed25519 and EdDSA using faults on Friday October 06, 2017 @10:36AM (#15417084)
Yes, don't really disagree with the general trust of that, particularly once you start considering the technical barriers to executing an attack.

My main point was that the threat model includes the manufacturer needing to maintain ownership of secrets more often than you'd expect. I'd suggest that your step 3 isn't as narrowing.

Whether meeting that model warrants building in resistance to classes of SCA is an almost independent question, and I would agree that it's not very likely in most cases. The consumer-facing industries in which you do see that (e.g. set-top box, printing) aren't really IoT ones, either.

Re:How to defeat Ed25519 and EdDSA using faults on Friday October 06, 2017 @10:17AM (#15416939)
I have some customers with a stronger threat model than 'physical access owns the secrets' for reasonably mundane 'IoT' products. IP protection / late-point differentiation / any as-a-service model requirements can bump you out of that category.

Fault attacks themselves require exploiting the structure of whatever primitive you're targeting, so in that sense whilst 'everything is susceptible' isn't false, it really does vary quite a bit, and attack strategies can be really quite complex. Some fault attacks on block ciphers are effectively augmented differential cryptanalysis.

In general you're not going to be able to take a library and be able to make any claims about protection against invasive or non-invasive SCA without first knowing about the hardware it will be run on, so agree that it's not usually meaningful to add countermeasures against aforementioned types of attacker.

IMO applied crypto is at its hardest when you're close to bare metal and you have a physical attacker.