news_embargo
This failure undoes much of the benefits of source port randomization. A patch is available from a third party, but it is not part of the standard source tree.
http://www.your.org/dnscache/
There are also attack scripts for djbdns.BIND, Unbound and other recursives have both SPR and duplicate query control. This fact explains things like this:
http://dnsreactions.tumblr.com/search/djbdns
From a poisoning point of view, BIND and Unbound are more secure
than djbdns. To be fair djbdns is no longer maintained, so this poisoning
fix has not been integrated).Security is relative. From a software coding point of view, djbdns is smaller, has fewer features (e.g., ipv6 and dnssec lacking). I.e., there might be coding errors in large code bases.
But for me, an unmaintained code base with known, unpatched attacks is not a good choice.
The root zsk is split over a group (Shamir share) held by mostly non-US key holders. (One from the US is Dan Kaminsky, whose work and my user name has special relevancy for you. You'd agree he's not part of the US government.)
I believe all the key holders are trustworthy, and if any were not, you'd need a majority (5 of the 7) to subvert the zsk. So an xkcd-wrench-style attack on the key by governments would require implausible circumstances.
The key ceremony is video taped and can be watched:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b9j-sfP9GUU
Other TLDs (some being countries) also hold key signing
ceremonies and video tape them. You can watch other
countries perform key signing as well. But these sovereign zsks are
subordinate to the ICANN community held keys.
I.e., it's more accurate (than your statement) to say that
there are seven people walking the earth who have
parent keys over actual country soveriegn zones. And while you
might not know all these people yourself, they're from the DNS
operator and hacker community. If anything, you're 180 degrees
wrong in your statement that governments run DNSSEC.You can read more about the DNSSEC root zone key management process and people (non-governmental) online. Here are informal press stories with the usual set of mistakes and minor errors:
http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/feb/28/seven-people-keys-worldwide-internet-security-web
https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2010/07/dnssec_root_key.html
And the root DNSSEC operation in general: http://www.root-dnssec.org/
I don't see the government in DNSSEC. Not even ICANN
can alter the root zsk (but they are of course instrumental
in any key roll over, since they manage the physical facilities
where the "DNSSEC Seven" must be iris scanned, etc., to sign
any proposed new root key).