mls
Re:Cache on Delivery (Mining random people's memcached)
on Friday August 06, 2010 @05:07AM (#1580592)
Can only speak for the current version (1.4.5), but it binds by default to all interfaces.
If a memcached was bound to non-public interface then it wouldn't be reachable from the internet (and you'd have to explicitly configure it as such). However, if you're running the cache and the app on separate machines, the cache will need to be reachable. For poorly thought out deployments this means publicly reachable.
Re:Cache on Delivery (Mining random people's memcached)
on Friday August 06, 2010 @05:01AM (#1580584)
Absolutely, there's no doubt that it's an operations issue rather than a memcached issue and, when found, indicates poor ops standards (remote enumeration of a cache is a debug feature apparently). With services moving out of private data centers and into the cloud, security tools are different from the arsenal used for internal apps; if you're an app guy deploying on EC2, you don't have a network security guy who's responsible for protecting your services. It's now your job to configure EC2 to protect your services, which is a small but significant difference. In terms of scanning for open ports, I think the main takeaway was that in distributed apps running off shared infrastructure, the basics often aren't followed by under pressure admins and devs. Memcached density was about 1 per 274 scanned addresses, which was higher than I'd have thought; it's apparently a mistake that's not uncommon.
Unfortunately it's often not good enough to point out open ports, and one needs to demonstrate exploitability. The main thrust of the talk was so say "if you come across memcacheds, don't skip them, there's coolness there". e.g. an open memcached used by Django directly equates to remote code exec due to Python's pickle.
You're spot on with the final point; firewall firewall firewall.
[fd: that's my name on the preso]