mil0
Re:Kazakhstan to MitM all HTTPS traffic starting Jan 1
on Wednesday December 02, 2015 @09:18PM (#10667316)
got a repo i can contribute to?
Re:Kazakhstan to MitM all HTTPS traffic starting Jan 1
on Wednesday December 02, 2015 @09:13PM (#10667298)
country wide, this is a loud call for a cloud, distributed proxy provider with a better track record than the telco, to offer tor-like tunnels to at least exit the MITM zone.
Re:Kazakhstan to MitM all HTTPS traffic starting Jan 1
on Wednesday December 02, 2015 @09:08PM (#10667275)
always love a good reference to Argo.
Re:Kazakhstan to MitM all HTTPS traffic starting Jan 1
on Wednesday December 02, 2015 @09:07PM (#10667271)
the ddos was achieved by altering the contents of one of the script on a large chinese site (was it baidu? google it). Once every user on that site loaded the tampered script, it made sure to send many requests to github.
Re:Kazakhstan to MitM all HTTPS traffic starting Jan 1
on Wednesday December 02, 2015 @08:33PM (#10667151)
How would the telco get their Private Trust Anchor into the certificate store ? More social engineering, i suppose. At the app level though, a chain resolution like what you describe is not required.