lo_zamoyski
The American auto lobby has spent nearly a century manipulating Americans and American culture by insinuating car ownership and transportation into what it means to be "American". The automobile is a symbol of freedom and independence and plays into the myth of rugged American individualism ("I can drive whenever I want, wherever I want") and masculinity ("I am a real man, because I am independent and because ownership demonstrates I have means"). Certainly, cars do afford a certain practical freedom and comfort for certain use cases—in part because public infrastructure and transport can be hostile to normal human activities instead of supporting them—but in the American mind, these aren't just weighed against a backdrop of practical concerns and superior goods. The car has a quasi-religious quality for many Americans. Getting your license and owning your first car is a practically institutionalized rite of passage into adulthood.
Gov't policy—some gladly endorsed by the auto lobby—also played a role. Zoning (like Euclidean zoning) and urban planning (or lack thereof), coupled with a lack of surviving and robust public transportation infrastructure (like public passenger rail), forced and continues to force Americans into car ownership even if they would prefer other means. The rise of postwar suburb, sprawl, and the death of walkable towns and cities has entrenched the need for car ownership. And we shouldn't forget the financial incentives. Mortgages underwritten by the FHA and VA rewarded sprawl with mortgages while penalizing denser development. Taxpayer revenue also funded roads while regulations capped what privately-owned "public" transportation could charge riders, forcing them into bankruptcy and opening transport up to the predation of companies like GM who snapped up their assets and ripped out rail in favor of their own buses.
However, we're seeing some pushback in Gen Z. American cities and certainly towns are no longer the polluted industrial centers they used to be. We also don't have the post-WWII pressure to divert wartime industry toward other ends to maintain employment, or Cold War fears of having too many people concentrated in large, easy-to-nuke urban centers.
If Tao has a knowledge of the topic (which he does), then it isn't by virtue of being a mathematician per se, but by virtue of an interest in the history of mathematics (which he has). Knowledge of math is enormously helpful here, but it does not imply historical knowledge.
We're talking about adopting cultural practices in a selective and transfigurative way. If a cultural practice doesn't conflict with the Church's teachings and would be beneficial, then it could be embraced as such. A cultural practice may also be transfigured and adapted into something that maintains a certain resemblance, but has a changed and elevated meaning. For instance, having encountered a culture that practices ancestor worship, it might take that practice and transfigure it into a restrained expression of filial piety that moves it away from idolatry. Pagan harvest festivals are another example where the symbolic meaning is changed.
Modern media has allowed the pope to receive unceasing attention that the papacy never possessed historically, but what is important to emphasize is that this is not a reflection of how the Church is administered or how authority is distributed. The idea that the pope is "running the Church" or "watching every member of the one and a half billion member flock like a busybody hawk" is a fiction drawn from jejune ignorance. Rome is notoriously slow to act, which should in general not be seen as a sign of incompetence, but as an expression of subsidiarity. It is much better to view the pope as the ultimate referee rather than some oppressive overlord. The moral ball is in your court, as it were.
W.r.t. absorbing what's around it, the Church has always recognized logos spermatikos or seminal reason, meaning, it recognizes reality as an intelligible creation of God, it recognizes the inherent rational nature of every human being, and thus it recognizes that every human being has an in principle capacity to recognize and know reality, to one degree or another. So, it sees no reason to suppose that there is nothing good or true or beautiful outside the Church and plenty of reason to recognize it and embrace it. What is good is good, what is true is true, what is beautiful is beautiful. When the Church encounters a culture, it seeks what is good within it and seeks to transfigure it in order to rescue its goodness and perfect it. Gratia non tollit naturam, sed perficit.
Social and cultural expectations and conventions are extremely important. Even in supposedly laissez-faire Western countries where traditional cultural expectations have withered to the point of laxity, people still live their lives according to convention and expectation, even if those conventions and expectations are increasingly vulgar and dictated by powerful interest. (Indeed, the fertility crisis is determined largely by patterns of convention. It used to be that, for most people, it was expected that you would marry and have children earlier rather than later. Now, our cultural expectations actually penalize that kind of behavior. You're supposed to "find yourself", "play the field", or "build up your career" first.)
Human beings operate more by convention than by moral reasoning. Society needs an environment demands good things from them. Even when we know what the right or good course of action is through moral reasoning and discernment, it is very helpful for social convention and culture to support those choices.
The law is also traditionally a source of guardrails that help people attain better lives.
I don't know who comes up with this stuff.
Aristotle wrote extensively about fish eggs, milt and breeding habits centuries before the Christian era. Not only that, fishermen throughout history were well aware that fish laid eggs.
On the other point, original sin applies exclusively to humans. Animals were never considered moral agents, nor were they subject to the Fall of Man in a way that required spiritual redemption.
> sauerkraut and kimchi are both pickled cabbage
Yes, but one uses Brassica oleracea while the other uses Brassica rapa.
...is not the same as claiming...
> LLMs favor LLM-generated passages over human written ones
Here, you're using the same LLM to both produce and judge the resulting work. If anything, I would expect an LLM to tend to prefer its own work given that the same training is producing and judging.
There are plenty of things that are difficult to understand that have been known by others for a long time. The point is that you don't understand those things. Your understanding of something doesn't benefit from someone else understanding it, per se. I will agree that having a guide does make it easier.
> If knowing was the valuable part, then nobody would need a PhD. You could know more by just reading textbooks. Research mathematicians research, everybody else just learns.
Knowing is the most valuable part! It's the whole point of research!
And where knowledge is concerned, there isn't a sharp line between what constitutes "learning" and what constitutes "research". How do you know a claim in a book is correct? You can take it on authority and just believe it. Or, you can seek to verify it yourself. As far as your own mind is concerned, you've discovered something for yourself. And what is a researcher doing? He's inferring things and reasoning and verifying his inferences. These are activities you use both during learning and during research.
That would be good news, but this does make the article more - not less - confusing. If he doesn't lean toward scientism or adopt a view that, when worked out fully, results in scientism, then it is difficult to grasp what the exact nature of the conflict is.
Language as an internal conceptualization is still (obviously) essential to logical reasoning. The question of how language and logic relate can, therefore, concern either the internal language of concepts or the expressed language and its grammar, the latter of which is related to logic in that it reflects to some degree the internal language, but it is not identical with it.
A similar question is now being asked: what is the point of doing research, etc. if something like AI can figure out everything?
The question betrays the parochial way in which many people think about knowledge. For them, knowledge is merely an instrument or an effect. It does not occur to them that knowing is a valuable thing in itself, that understanding is valuable and desirable. Yes, some knowledge has merely practical value, but theoretical knowledge is primarily sought for its own sake, because we desire to know reality.
So, even if Terrence Tao, an AI agent, or who or whatever arrives at some bit of new knowledge, it doesn't benefit you as a knowing subject unless you understand it yourself and make it your own.
Each special field or domain focuses on a particular aspect of reality. Snow's view appears to lean toward the scientistic, and scientism is not merely an available and defensible stance in the ring, but an incoherent position to begin with. The central claim of scientism—that empirical science is the only source of knowledge—is itself not a scientific claim and not one that empirical science can demonstrate. To establish the correctness of this proposition requires us to step outside or above empirical science in order to make empirical science itself an object of study. But as soon as we do that, we have by that very act disproven scientism. One can only wonder how such a basic philosophical error fails to figure into the reasoning of scientism's advocates, especially given the failure of logical positivism which crashed and burned for very similar reasons.
So, to reject scientism isn't to reject science for what it truly is. It is to reject sola scientia.
The solution to the problem must occur on a philosophical plane. Only on a philosophical plane can we ask (and answer!) "what does empirical science actually tell us?" or "what is the knowledge the humanities give us?". Only on a philosophical plane can be talk about metaphysics and the nature of being (where metaphysics is the general science, while all the others are special sciences). Only philosophy allows us to relate and to locate the fruits of every field in the larger patchwork of human knowledge.
"I easily observe hundreds to thousands of bugs per week"
which should be rewritten as
"I easily observe hundreds to thousands of things that I consider to be bugs per week"
which is to say that the "bug" is in the eye of the beholder. It seems the author stretches the definition of "bug" to include cases where something functions, but in a manner that is open to improvement or not to his taste.
Rhetoric is persuasion under the presupposition that what you are trying to persuade someone of is true. Sophistry is indifferent to the truth and is merely concerned with results. Rhetoric respects the humanity of the interlocutor. Sophistry seeks to exploit him.
Or the appearance of nice things. Consider the suburb as promoted by American film which has left a very deep mark on the global imagination and that, regrettably, maintains a strong influence over housing markets and urban planning to this day.
Of course, a great deal of panic over fake news wasn’t necessarily over fake news per se, but whose fake news and the loss of control over the “official narrative” that legacy media used to have a monopoly over. This isn’t a vindication of the heaps of slop published on the internet, just a more synoptic take IMO.
People miss Cronkite, because that style of media made them feel certain in their opinions and in “official consensus reality”, regardless of whether it was true or not and whether it was a trustworthy authority or not.
The law already concerns itself with determining intent (hence murder vs. manslaughter). I don’t see why similar criteria and methods cannot be applied here. We can assess the objectively bad psychological consequences of social media and look for evidence that establishes moral certainty about the intent.
I am not impressed with manufactured skepticism.
Quoting the article...
"Nearly half of senior leaders say they would trust a chatbot’s judgment over their own, on questions they were hired to answer."
If they're using it like an oracle, then that is worrying, but how worrying - practically speaking - would depend on the baseline prior to the use of AI and how that compares with what the AI is spitting out.
The first big hazard of this AI worship is, of course, the atrophy of reasoning skills. I don't think there's an especially distinct skill needed here. A rational person is able to evaluate claims made by others responsibly based on a combination of proxy signals like an earned reputation of trustworthiness, integrity, and authority, the logical coherence of the claim, and plausibility and the absence of contradiction between the claims and more certain baseline knowledge.
So, psychologically speaking, the ease with which we obtain credible-sounding answers is a major motivator, but two other cultural factors support this credulity, namely, magical & superstitious and the broad acceptance that bullshitting is an okay thing to do. Both weaken the ability to apprehend and reason about reality in different ways (bullshitting, for instance, reinforces a carelessness about and indifference to the truth; magical thinking more directly sabotages reason; both undermine confidence in reason and place stock in the sub-rational instead).
> I didn’t make that claim in any implied way, I asserted, correctly, that Aristotle is not an Abrahamic thinker.
I was trying to make sense of what your two disconnected sentences were saying and used this as an opportunity to address what I suspected may be the underlying presuppositions.
> The Nichomachean Ethics doesn’t discuss ethics within any context of absolute free will even
Aristotle does, in fact, discuss "choice" (προαίρεσις) and the "voluntary" (τὸ ἑκούσιον) to lay the ground for moral responsibility. I grant you it is not identical to the view of, say, Aquinas who goes further than Aristotle - indeed, he takes Augustine's account of the will and integrates it with the Aristotelian - but it isn't a wholesale departure from the Aristotelian either. Aquinas calls the will "rational appetite" (voluntas ut ratio) which is a very Aristotelian take. A notable and immediately relevant Neoplatonic refinement he makes here - consistent with Aristotle - is the supplementation with voluntas ut natura.
Furthermore, I didn't write "absolute free will", by which I can only assume you mean "sheer will"? Rather, I intentionally wrote "freedom to choose between alternatives apprehended by the intellect". Absolute free will is more of a modern, secular notion, not a classical or Christian one (we do see its origins in the "sheer will" of Ockham), hence why we obsessively speak of "sovereignty" and "autonomy" today.
> Most Christian theologies would vehemently disagree precisely because having the supra-knowledge of the Mystery imparted upon one necessarily brings one's being into the dimension of revealed universality.
Whatever the Abrahamic influence on the course of Aristotelian thought, there is no reason to believe that Abrahamic influence was absolutely necessary to "universalize ethics" (take the early Stoics, for instance). This is expected and returns to my original point, that much of ethics is knowable in principle through unaided reason alone.
People have casually dismissed Aristotle in total merely because his physics is obsolete, even though it is separable from and in no way necessarily implied by his metaphysics. Similarly, his views about slaves and so on do not follow from these core principles and are rather auxiliary rationalizations of prevailing cultural practices. It was very much a failure on Aristotle's part to be consistent with his own natural law views.
> All three of the Abrahamic theologies were infected by Neoplatonism
"Infected" here is a needlessly tendentious and loaded term. I don't consider this influence as somehow undermining the essential core of Aristotelian thought. I do not think Aristotle was condemned to hold the aforementioned views on slaves, etc.
> Aristotle was describing in Metaphysics a cosmology concerned with unpacking the notion of motion as the actualization of potentiality, hence, "First Mover", which is not at all an Abrahamic idea.
Under a strict understanding faithful to Aristotle's complete views, yes, the Prime Mover is not "Abrahamic". But that doesn't mean the essential characteristics of the Prime Mover are in contradiction with, say, a traditionally Christian account, even if they are incomplete. At the very least, the Prime Mover establishes that there is a first actualizer along with some properties this actualizer must have.
> An aside, but the Muslims called Aristotle “The Philosopher” (Ibn Rashud, Ibn Sina), and that tradition was received through the Muslims by their European readers.
Yes, but this doesn't contradict what I wrote.
Pro-tip: knock off the vulgarity and avoid making ignorant remarks that pander to presently fashionable sentiments. It doesn't "spice up" your text or make it more "fun" or "real", unless you mean "really bad". It makes it obnoxious, likely phony (I'm giving you the benefit of the doubt here), and base.
Theoretical science isn't about usefulness per se, but knowledge and understanding for its own sake, so a better way to say this is to point out that you only benefit in such cases if you understand things yourself. If understanding is the goal - which it is in the case of true theory - then the only way to attain that goal is to actually attain understanding. What good is it if an LLM produces a valid proof, but no one grasps it? This isn't like digging a ditch where it doesn't matter who does it or how he does it as long as you have a ditch. Here, the ditch is knowledge, as it were.
Which is to say that the founding of the Church by Jesus is not rooted in some wise teachings, but in claims about his identity. If his claim of Godhood is false, then the Church and the Christian faith are total charlatanism.
One very common error people make is to believe that ethics - at least epistemically and for the most part - is sectarian. This view seems to stem from an ultimately nihilistic presupposition that morality is a fiction supplied by the fiction of religion. But that is not the natural law view and thus a view alien to both Aristotle and to Christianity. The natural law view is that human beings have a nature, which is most centrally to be a rational animal with the freedom to choose between alternatives apprehended by the intellect. Thus, Man has moral responsibility, because he plays a part in choosing what he does. Accordingly, because human nature defines what is good or bad for human beings (that which actualizes human potential in accord with reason vs. that which frustrates or opposes reason and the actualization of potential in accord with it), we bear responsibility for how we exercise our powers. Aristotle wasn't completely, but the core principles in the Metaphysics or his ethical works or in epistemology are - in my view - spot on.
What Christianity does or claims to do is supplement what is knowable by unaided reason with revealed knowledge - the object of faith - which, of course, does have ethical import, but it does not negate or supplant what is knowable by unaided reason.
FWIW, Aquinas drew heavily from Aristotle and had such enormous respect for Aristotle, he referred to him as simply "the Philosopher".
You also can't ignore assortive mating. We're not all in the same mating pool, as it were. Women prefer men taller than they are, but that doesn't mean that a woman of 1.25m will pair with a man of 2m. The typical height difference between husband and wife is about 10-15cm, regardless of the absolute height of either spouse.