ky1ebot1337

I think it is hard to estimate what we don't know. In our first scan when we found 166 vulnerabilities, we wouldn't be able to guess there were 900+ more vulns to find in the code base. We are in the same situation again: now we find 900+ vulns, are there no more vulns to find, 1k more, or even more than that. I think it'd be an interesting benchmark problem if we can have a formally proved safe, large program as the ground truth, inject synthetic vulnerabilities to it, then ask the model to exhaustively find vulns, and use that as a benchmark results.

These are distinct vulnerabilities counted by the number of patches. The patch generation system performs variant analysis. So, each patch can potentially stop multiple exploits. The raw exploits number is higher than what we reported in the post. We don't want to cause the confusion why #patch != #exploit, so we used the smaller number there. These vulns are all kernel specific. Userspace software running as root was not in scope of the analysis.

(I am the author the pipeline, just created an account to answer some questions :D) My goal is to work towards a vuln-free Internet. What I observed is that stronger models can find many more vulnerabilities that weaker models cannot. If compute permits (there are other projects to secure besides Linux), I plan to scan Linux again with every newer generation of cyber models.