kofalt
Evidence includes but is not limited to: Their user interface appears to intentionally border on unusable, a rambling Quora post by a C-level exec about how advanced search (a la Gmail) would ruin the world, and they've shut down their API, making it harder for third-party sites to index their selection, and allow positive UX to be possible thereby.
I guess I'll always be assuming it behaves like Firefox, so I'm tripping myself up a lot.
Either way, very cool app.
I was irate that I had to type out URLs, until I thought to try that :)
Bug report: hitting the Back button takes me out of the browser, while the back arrow goes backwards in web history. I expected them to be the other way around (behaving more like a normal browser).
> What I am saying is that it is no longer fundamentally the same thing I was originally hired to help build nor is it compatible with my vision for the future.
I've heard elsewhere that 2.0 will be an entirely unrelated framework which will be still called Angular for no good reason.
Dismissing this opinion as a troll is no longer productive after the above commentary by an Angular developer.
The core "translate flags into running container options" works fine IMO, it's the centralized transport causing the issue. Which isn't the end of the world, as distributing tarballs is not exactly a demanding task.
As an example / plug, I helped write a (prototype) tool that lets you import a docker image from the registry, then transport / version it separately: https://github.com/polydawn/hroot
Thus, integrating via `docker load` + `docker export` is possible & reasonable.
Linked from the article: https://securityblog.redhat.com/2014/12/18/before-you-initia...
I would like to experience the next problem, please. If only for variety's sake.
HTTPS might be better than getting a website in cleartext, but you'd have to be a madman to claim that HTTPS is safe, sane, or secure.
As pointed out elsewhere in the thread, there are few attacks that allow you to listen in on an SSL connection's content without also allowing you to modify that content - say, with a version that pastebins your keys.
Hence my argument that JS cannot provide anything SSL lacks, plus or minus some wishful thinking. Combine this with the fact that it's impossible to protect against a MITM-modified JS payload (see the "chicken-egg problem" portion), and you have a rather uphill battle here.
My argument would be that trying to protect against passive attackers with JS adds nothing beyond what SSL already offers.
Which is already required as a matter of course, and already compromises the payload if SSL is broken (again).
So, yeah - if you rolled your very own library that's unique to this planet for exactly one website, congratulations! You're secure as long as there are no attackers! Doesn't really say anything useful about your security though. Or about the viability of using a fundamentally broken crypto platform to do crypto.
Most CVEs that come to mind assume a somewhat determined attacker.
It takes a reasonably determined attacker to commit to rails without permission [1] or run a ten-line perl script to crash a server [2] too.
Waving away a problem via "the bad guys would need to think for more than one second" is not exactly reassuring.
[1]: https://github.com/rails/rails/commit/b83965785db1eec019edf1...