jasonkwon
Delaware has the most developed corporate law and support services for corporate transactions (you can file charters, mergers, etc. within an hour there; good luck doing that in most other states, including CA). Every company that incorporates in Delaware adds further value to every other company that's in Delaware. Each marginal company adds to the Delaware legal corpus and support structure because (1) it ensures Delaware has the greatest variety and largest supply of potentially significant corporate legal cases, which means it has the greatest variety and largest supply of actually adjudicated cases and thus developed and stable law, and (2) it pays Delaware annual fees for those support services. This in turn attracts more companies to incorporate there because of that ever expanding corpus/infrastructure. And so on and so forth.
Some amount of re-vesting is often required at Series A, but it largely has to do with how vested the founders already are. If for example they've been working on the company for only a year, the existing vesting schedule will probably be left alone. On the other hand, if they've been working on the company for multiple years and are close to fully vested at Series A, it's almost guaranteed that the Series A investor will ask the founder to re-vest some amount of shares (for the reason you describe).
Re-vesting generally does not show up again after the Series A.
If you get fired before you fully vest, whether you leave with the equity you have or all your equity is something you can negotiate as part of the vesting terms.
In practice, the firms that give 1-pagers don't really try to pull a bait and switch like that. They offer the 1-pager so they can close quickly, not so they can get quickly into the no shop to drive onerous terms. Could a firm consciously adopt that strategy? Sure, but it wouldn't last very long because people talk to each other.
Also, even the 1-pager goes into detail on liquidation preference, veto rights, board composition, drag-along and founder vesting. These are the items that get negotiated a lot or are otherwise really important to know before signing up.
As mentioned elsewhere, this exercise was descriptive, not prescriptive. Some of the founder friendliest investors use term sheets that look similar to this. Some of the unfriendliest investors still send 10 page term sheets.
I think if the pool is not part of the premoney, investors just adjust the valuation to compensate.
Just focus on the final output. Take the term sheet and work with your lawyer to model out how much you own after the round is closed. Is that a good deal or not? If you don't like it, there are multiple ways to increase your post-closing ownership. Moving the option pool into the post-money is one of the hardest ways to accomplish that because you are trying to move the investor up on both valuation and convention.
The anti-dilution adjustment is generally not something that applies to ordinary course dilution (like employee option grants).
The veto on company sales breaks founder friendly occasionally (you need a decent amount of leverage). Some examples:
1. It doesn’t exist 2. It only applies to sales that return less than X multiple of investor’s capital invested 3. It only applies to sales where the founders are getting retention packages (from acquirer) that substantially exceed their recent compensation
The veto on financings is present almost always. A founder would need rare leverage to get rid of it.
On both of these vetoes though there are additional constraints on abusive usage by investors — reputation being the most obvious one.
Most of the legal costs don’t arise from the term sheet. They come from legal diligence and drafting the definitive docs.
You’re right that many safe investors have a particular % in mind when the invest. The problem with the old framework is that they had no certainty on that. They could invest $1m at $9m premoney cap and think they got 10% but if the company raised more money on a bunch of other Safes or caps, they ended up with a lot less. The dilution confusion impacted both founders and investors alike. In the model you saw, the safe investors got exactly what they bargained for, 16.7% (2m invested at 12m post = 2/12 = 16.7%), and then ended up with ~11% because they were diluted by the Series A round. That’s what happens - each round dilutes the next. It’s also what would happen if those investors just did a priced round instead of using a safe.
The safe investors also now have the option to ask for a side letter that gives them the right to invest Pro Rata at the Series A. They didn’t have this in the prior framework. And if they did do Pro Rata here, they would probably end up with more ownership than they would in the old framework. This is actually more consistent with how most investors invest. Spread bets early and then double down on the ones that are working, based on an ownership level that they know they have today.
I think points #2 and #3 continue to apply. You can't say that the new framework will result in more dilution in "basically every circumstance," because that assumes all of the surrounding aspects of the circumstances will continue to remain the same. I can model out a scenario for you as well that shows a thoughtful founder now able to better plan out a round using a series of escalating valuation caps, rewarding the earliest investors, to raise the same amount of money but for less overall dilution, in precisely the manner described by PG in his original post. Or another scenario where investors are ok with slightly higher valuations because they have certainty of ownership. Or another scenario where a founder who previously would've raised an unnecessary extra 5% now doesn't, because the dilution math is clearer.
Your point about safe dilution being 15-30% is exactly right, and exactly one of the reasons we're doing this. The high part of that range is too high. People are raising too much, on too dilutive terms, because of the lack of transparency. Founder dilution is driven by what everyone else on the cap table is getting, not just us. If that sum total of "everyone else" is still less, founders are still net better off. If you want to frame the dilution aspect all indexed to YC ownership, that's ok, but the outcome was already pre-figured by your choice of framing in the first place. We can agree to disagree on that.
That said, I think one thing we can definitely agree on is that the success or failure of this new framework will be judged by whether founders are more or less diluted in the end, and have a harder or easier time raising money. We've already made our bet, so there's not much to do here but let it play out.
You're right though that there's a flavor of safes that contain both a discount and a valuation cap, and the investor gets the benefit of whichever approach results in more shares, and your explanation is good.