iamsohungry
Does it? What result are you trying to produce by this legislation?
If you're trying to produce the result that fewer people use X harmful substance, then it absolutely does not make sense to regulate the substance itself. Evidence suggests that regulation merely makes selling the substance more profitable and buying the substance more "edgy", making the substance more dangerous. Instead, it makes sense to provide better programs for treatment and education around the substance, which results in lower usage, higher recovery rates when someone does use it, and less incentives for people to traffic the substance.
But if you're trying to produce profits for prison corporations and further militarize law enforcement, by all means, let's make all substances illegal.
I'm saying that our current involvement in Syria is worse than not being involved, and talking about Syria as if "helping" is even an option our leaders are considering is naive, and buying into the propaganda.
I can see a number of ways we could be involved positively in Syria, but we're not, and we're not going to be.
> It's not an was call. If you do nothing people die. If you try to do something people will die. The idea is to pave a better path to the future.
This was the propaganda used to excuse invading Iraq, but it's incredibly naive to believe it.
> Or even today, do we say, forget Syria. Seal it up, let them sort things out and condemn a whole country's population to great suffering?
That's exactly what we'd be doing if they weren't sitting in the way of fossil fuel transportation routes.
It's ridiculous to claim that we're doing this to reduce the suffering of people in Syria. The US has supplied Israel with bombs that have been used to kill Syrian civilians for more than half a century, yet suddenly we care about the suffering of Syrians now? Yeah, right.
> Portability matters. If you want your language to be useful and available to as many people as possible, why would you seek to artificially limit the number of platforms it can be built on, just so you can avoid writing the bootstrap in C? I'm sure there is some amount of pride on the part of the language author when their language can bootstrap itself, but it certainly isn't a pragmatic decision.
This problem is easily solved by having a rule that each new version of the compiler must compile in an older version of the compiler. The first few versions are written in C, and once the compiler is self-hosting, new versions of the compiler are compiled on older versions of the compiler. This gives you a path from C to the current version of the language.
In practice, this happens very naturally, because it's how compilers are usually written. Assuming you have version control and the first versions of the compiler are written in C, you usually have the ability to bootstrap up from C. The only thing missing in many projects is documentation and tooling for that process.
This allows auditability and for you to look back at the state of the data at any time, but the largest benefit, in my opinion, is that it decouples data from its data structure. This allows you to treat data structures like "caches" that are efficiently structured for how they will be used. If you want, you don't have to choose between relational databases or graph databases or anything else: you can play the same set of events into different structures and query the appropriately structured database for the kind of query you're doing. It also allows you to implement security at the data storage level in a very simple and granular way: you can reject events based on predicates which update as themselves as they receive modifications to the permissions, and distribute filtered streams of data to users based on what events they are allowed to see. Overall, the power of this method is very large.
1. Neither can anyone, because we don't have examples of large-scale usage of mesh networks, and the amount of research that has gone into mesh networks is nowhere near as extensive as exists with ISPs. There's no reason to assume that mesh networks will always have higher latency, especially in places where i.e. Comcast is choking connections.
2. The small-scale mesh networks which already exist are demonstrably adequate for many, many use-cases. Mesh networks which handle text and image web browsing, email, instant messaging, are still extremely useful even if they have trouble handling streaming video and video games.
I think that the article isn't saying we've lost the ability to choose privacy. It's saying that we've created a world where there's incentives to give up privacy, and very little consideration of what that choice means: sometimes we don't even comprehend that we're making that choice. Your own comment is an example:
> I do agree with the author that private space is important though. It's nice have time to reflect without the worry of interruption or judgement. In these "Open offices" it can be an actual problem, I seem to be the only person I know who would be fine with just a cubicle.
I don't see a cubicle as being private at all. It doesn't prevent people from interrupting or judging me, it only allows me a little respite from distraction, and even that it does poorly. Contrast this with the concept of a study, a room that houses rarely have any more, but in which much of the work of the world has been done.
Your very example of a "private" space demonstrates the ease with which one can give up privacy without even considering the choice.
How could this possibly be reasonable?
Being able to look at the source code is a huge part of regulating code in life-and-death applications. Medical devices, cars, planes, train systems, etc. all need to be held to safety standards, and not allowing regulators access to the source code significantly inhibits their ability to do their job.
> If you want to audit a closed-source program for bugs and backdoors, people have been able to do this successfully hundreds (of thousands?) of times with standard tools like debuggers, disassemblers, and automated program analysis tools. The fact that a program is closed source has not stopped anyone from researching how it works. Ask ANY security researcher if it suddenly becomes impossible.
First of all, there are cases where you're just flat wrong. The Gauss virus contains an encrypted payload which is encrypted with a few system strings, meaning that when it runs in that system it will execute the encrypted code. It's impossible to audit the encrypted code without knowing the properties of the system it's intended to run on. Admittedly this is currently an unusual case, but given the incentives, it's unlikely that this will remain unusual. Hiding proof of code like the code in the Volkswagen emissions scandal[2] presents a large barrier to regulation, and it's not hard to imagine cases where it would make proving wrongdoing outright impossible.
Even in cases where an encrypted payload is not used, you cannot in good faith argue that the capability of auditing a binary is equivalent to the capability of auditing the source code. Yes, it's possible in most cases, but obviously it's significantly harder to audit computer generated, optimized, and decompiled assembly code than it is to audit code written in, say, C. The skill and time required to audit a binary is such that it's cost prohibitive in most cases: in the Volkswagen case, they discovered the fraudulent code with a $50,000 study that white-box tested the code by driving the car.[3] My guess is that an audit of the C code could have revealed something like:
if(car_is_being_emissions_tested()) {
...
}
In short, it's absolutely not reasonable to tie the hands of regulators by preventing them access to the source code. Doing so is equivalent giving up on regulating a large fraction of possible anti-regulation behaviors.
And this is only talking about regulation, when the binary being audited is produced by a company trying to skirt regulation. Even more concerns arise when the binary being audited might be partially created by a government. The NSA has well-known capabilities in this area, and we have no reason to believe that China (where many devices in the US are manufactured) has similar capabilities or will in the near future.
[1] https://securelist.com/blog/incidents/33561/the-mystery-of-t...
[2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Volkswagen_emissions_scandal
[3] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Volkswagen_emissions_scandal#U...
If we can provide a mesh network that is as effective as older topologies but cheaper, the problem is solved, period.
If we break up ISPs into smaller ISPs, then we have to maintain that solution, as giant companies are constantly lobbying government to allow them to re-establish monopolistic practices. History tells us anti-monopolistic policies don't last. The split and re-merging of phone companies happened in under a decade. Glass-Steagall worked for a long time, but finally died.
I have no argument that there are major technical hurdles to clear before we can have mesh networks, but once those hurdles are cleared, the power is decentralized into the hands of individuals. Individuals can join together to force through legislation, but the power remains centralized in government, and maintaining that is extremely difficult.
To be clear, I give money to the EFF and I've called my congressmen on issues like net neutrality: I don't mean to downplay the importance of these efforts. But these are temporary solutions, workarounds to the problem, rather than solutions.
Ugh. You realize that people can do things for more than one reason?
The solution is decentralization through mesh networks.
No, I'd be saying that about any other vendor who released code under a proprietary open source license, too.
> Who cares that Apple controls GPL software installed on almost every GNU/Linux machine?
How exactly do you think they do that?
odd_numbers = range(1, limit, 2)
doubled_odd_numbers = [n * 2 for n in odd_numbers]You don't get to have both. You have to take time out of the experience to take a picture of it.
> typically so that they can remember it.
This reason makes sense if the person has some form of alzheimer's, sure.
If you want something to remind you of it: have T-shirts I bought at every concert I've ever been to, which have the benefit of supporting the band and not taking time from the show and the experiences of the people behind me. They're also something I'll actually look at on a regular basis, because there are few enough of them that I can realistically look through them all, and most of them are still in good enough condition that I wear them occasionally. I've recently switched to buying records at the concerts instead, which has an even more direct connection to the experience.
> spending five minutes snapping a few photos at a two hour concert is not going to "ruin" anything.
Except those five minutes.
"Internet.org provides access to a subset of the internet that Facebook chooses to pay for."
> Last time I glanced through the agreement, Facebook is just trying to avoid paying for HD photos and video downloads, which would increase the cost of Internet.org beyond feasibility.
This could be achieved by choking bandwidth, which would be easier to implement, simpler, and more transparent. Instead, you get stuff like:
"In order for your content to be proxied as described above, your URLs may be re-written and embedded content (like javascript and content originating from another domain) removed. In addition, secure content is not supported and may not load." [1]
Let's be absolutely clear here: Facebook wants to control what content gets into Free Basics and how it's presented, and is willing to make security impossible in order to do it. This enables both censorship and mass surveillance controlled by Facebook and whoever is willing to pay them.
> The users of Internet.org get free access to Facebook as well as the other services being provided and that doesn't detract from the service or make the whole initiative evil.
It's not the things users get access to that I'm worried about, it's the things they don't get access to, and who else gets access to those user's data.
[1] https://developers.facebook.com/docs/internet-org/participat...
That's true, but it seems absurd to me to place a higher value on a photo than the experience itself.
It's absolutely not direct connection. You're looking at the phone which is looking at the thing, not looking at the thing. It's more direct than a professional photograph, but it's less direct than looking at the thing.
> A professional photograph depersonalizes it.
Looking at it through a phone depersonalizes it.
1. It only prevents you from connecting over a MitM'ed connection if the cert is already pinned, i.e. if you've visited the site before.
2. If your connection is MitM'ed, you have no way to securely access the site you want except connecting over another channel.