happythomist
Yes, the NEP proposed extending some natural gas pipelines. You neglected to mention that it also imposed price controls and new taxes on oil and gas revenues.
Marc Lalonde, the minister responsible, literally said after the fact that the goal of the program was to shift oil and gas revenue from the provinces and industry to Ottawa:
"The major factor behind the NEP wasn't Canadianization or getting more from the industry or even self sufficiency," [...] "The determinant factor was the fiscal imbalance between the provinces and the federal government [...] "Our proposal was to increase Ottawa's share appreciably, so that the share of the producing provinces would decline significantly and the industry's share would decline somewhat."
These kinds of abuses must be addressed by Congress, not the courts.
Something I've noticed is that the SD card corrupts easily, though that may be simply because I'm using a phone charger as the power supply.
I discovered that although the Model B does not support natively booting off USB, you can still put an updated bootcode.bin [1] on the SD card which will enable this functionality. Hopefully my flash drive will not corrupt as easily.
[1] https://github.com/raspberrypi/documentation/blob/master/har...
Thanks for the discussion! :)
Whether the system "works" or "doesn't work" is dependent on what the machine was designed to do, which is not an objective physical fact about the machine. Perhaps the machine was not meant to open the door when an object is detected, but to close it instead, or to do something else entirely; only the designer would be able to tell you one way or the other.
The same is true for all computation, and that is Searle's point.
> A computer (the theoretical model) is, be definition, something that can perform coherent reasoning without any special internal state.
Computers don't actually engage in reasoning, though, for the same reason. A machine is just a physical process, and physical processes do not have determinate semantic content.
Ross and Feser then argue that because thoughts do have determinate semantic content, they are necessarily immaterial, and I think they are correct.
(This argument is unrelated to qualia; I don't think qualia are fundamental to reason itself.)
What does "inseparable" mean? That the sensation occurs at the same time that the neurons fire? That may be true, but it doesn't make them equivalent.
> It's like saying a flashlight that is on is different than photons traveling away from a light bulb with a battery and a current.
They're not the same, for what it's worth. The term "flashlight" conveys a certain intent and structure that "photons traveling away from a light bulb with a battery and a current" does not.
> The sensation of red is caused by and is only possible by neurons firing. The neurons firing causes and only results in the sensation of red. The observer does not know the difference.
The fact that two different phenomena are closely coupled via a cause and effect relationship does not make them the same phenomena.
If you push two magnets together, the fact that the same force causes them to attract or repel does not mean that the motion of the first is literally equivalent to the motion of the second, or that the force itself is literally equivalent to either motion. They are closely correlated, but ultimately distinct.
You just can't avoid the fact that qualitative phenomena do exist in their own right. They can't be explained away using a physical model that assumes from the get go that they don't exist.
Erwin Schrodinger said:
> Scientific theories serve to facilitate the survey of our observations and experimental findings. Every scientist knows how difficult it is to remember a moderately extended group of facts, before at least some primitive theoretical picture about them has been shaped. It is therefore small wonder, and by no means to be blamed on the authors of original papers or of text-books, that after a reasonably coherent theory has been formed, they do not describe the bare facts they have found or wish to convey to the reader, but clothe them in the terminology of that theory or theories. This procedure, while very useful for our remembering the facts in a well-ordered pattern, tends to obliterate the distinction between the actual observations and the theory arisen from them. And since the former always are of some sensual quality, theories are easily thought to account for sensual qualities; which, of course, they never do.
I guess the idea is that an abstract concept like "the understanding that 1 + 1 = 2" would be easier to "quantify" in the relevant sense than "the feeling of red", but I don't think that's true.
The very concept of a representation presumes an intellect in which that representation is mapped to the underlying concept. No particular physical state objectively signifies some abstract concept any more than the word "dog" objectively signifies that particular type of animal. But our mental states must be able to do so, because denying this would be denying our ability to engage in coherent reasoning and therefore self-defeating. So those mental states can't be "implemented" solely using physical states.
This argument was actually proposed by the late philosopher James Ross and developed in greater detail by Edward Feser. [1] A similar argument -- though he didn't take it as far -- was made by John Searle (of Chinese Room fame). [2]
But in any event, I would reject the notion that any representation of "the feeling of red" is equivalent to the sensation itself.
> Note that the argument for qualia is not one that proves the existence of qualia - it is essentially only a definition. We have no reason to believe that the thing which the term qualia describes actually exists in the world, beyond our own personal experience, which is circular in a way.
Well, I think it is self-evident that qualia exist for me, and that those same qualia demonstrate that there are physical correlates of qualia. I also think there is good reason to think that qualia exist in others because we share the same physical correlates.
Can I completely prove or disprove that others have qualia? No -- not you, not a rock, not an AGI. But I still have the physical correlates, which gives me some basis to draw conclusions.
[1] http://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2017/01/revisiting-ross-on-i...
[2] https://philosophy.as.uky.edu/sites/default/files/Is%20the%2...
Even if we knew that a person saw red when such and such neurons fired, the neurons firing would still just be a material correlate. It would be in no way equivalent to or explain anything about the sensation itself.
A sequence of neurons firing is not equivalent to the sensation of red. It doesn't even tell you anything about the nature of the sensation of colour more broadly, or why the sensation of red looks the way it does and not like, say, the sensation of blue or yellow instead.
All you have is a material correlate -- a merely descriptive physical "law".
Searle: "Thus for example the wall behind my back is right now implementing the Wordstar program, because there is some pattern of molecule movements which is isomorphic with the formal structure of Wordstar. But if the wall is implementing Wordstar then if it is a big enough wall it is implementing any program, including any program implemented in the brain."
That's why Searle asks "who is the user?" At some point things have to stop being observer relative and have an intrinsic meaning or essence of their own.
> Got one: the brain!
That's circular reasoning. The point is that qualia are not something which, in principle, can be the subject of computation. There is no way to represent the fullness of sensation itself, like the redness of red or the softness of silk, as information. So how can our brains be "computing" it?
The Wikipedia definition of "computation" is "any type of calculation that includes both arithmetical and non-arithmetical steps and which follows a well-defined model". But this only makes sense in the context of a designer or observer external to the computation who can identify what that model is and thereby make sense of the output. So you can't say that brain processes are computational, much less life itself, without committing some variation of the homunculus fallacy.
John Searle (famously known for his Chinese Room thought experiment) made this argument in a paper called "Is the Brain a Digital Computer?" [1] He points out that "if we are to suppose that the brain is a digital computer, we are still faced with the question 'And who is the user?'"
A related problem is qualia. There is no computational process that will produce the sensations of colour or sound or touch. At best you will have some representation that requires having actually experienced those sensations to understand it. So a computational process cannot be the basis of or an explanation for those sensations, and therefore consciousness generally.
[1] https://philosophy.as.uky.edu/sites/default/files/Is%20the%2...
Not commenting on what OP said, but I don't think this is correct. Even in principle, how can any computational process produce conscious experiences, which are by nature subjective and unquantifiable?
Politically motivated refusal of service by Amazon or other Silicon Valley firms is at least an order of magnitude more likely than any coup by the US military, much less a Trumpist one.
Why shouldn't they? If the letter is libelous, then they're responsible for distributing it to a larger audience.
The reality is that if we had a Democratic President and Senate, nobody on the left would be arguing that we have to hold off until the election. Chuck Schumer would no doubt be insisting that the Senate "do [its] job", as he did in 2016. [1]
It's hard to fault McConnell for doing precisely what he was elected to do -- confirm conservative judges and justices.
[1] https://twitter.com/SenSchumer/status/701953299268902912
I think this can be a reasonable argument, but it depends on whether criminal suspects generally comply with decryption orders. If most don't, then it is understandable that the government also wants the keys to reside with parties that almost certainly will comply: OEMs and service providers.
> It will get abused. Just like wire tapping got abused, just like NSA surveillance got abused.
Yes, warrants get abused, but they're necessary for the criminal justice system to function.
I think we need to be careful not to conflate this issue with warrantless surveillance, which is a different beast.
> Furthermore, having a master key floating around means that at some point, inevitably, a foreign government or organization will get ahold of it.
I don't see why this is necessarily true, and many Internet services are premised on it not being true. HTTPS requires that you trust the ability of CAs to keep their master keys secret. Gmail and Outlook require that you trust that Google and Microsoft will keep their master keys secret.
> But the issue with bills like the EARN IT Act is that they make end-to-end encryption completely infeasible for any company to implement.
I realize that. My point was that there's an argument to be made that in practice, most people don't use E2EE or even need it in the first place.
E2EE is probably necessary in certain cases -- for example, if you're a dissident in an authoritarian regime. But that doesn't mean it needs to come standard on every iPhone.
To be honest, I'm undecided on this issue. Maybe the security benefits of standard E2EE are worth making it more difficult for law enforcement to execute lawful search warrants. But to me the answer isn't obvious.
Not exactly. Yes, revealing the combination requires the person to implicitly admit that they know the what the combination is. But if the government can prove that they already know this "testimony" -- which they can in most cases -- then the "foregone conclusion" doctrine applies and the 5th Amendment privilege cannot be asserted. See, for example, the Massachusetts Supreme Court's decision in Commonwealth v. Jones. [1]
There is also conflicting 11th Circuit precedent that further requires the government to establish with "reasonable particularity" what is on the encrypted device. [2] In my opinion this is not correct; the contents of the drive have nothing to do with the testimonial value of the combination. In any event, this issue will eventually need to be resolved at the Supreme Court.
> I think it is unreasonable because it's asking companies to willfully violate their user's privacy and trust, and to severely undermine encryption as a whole. There is zero chance that this does not get abused.
I don't see how it violates user privacy or trust. In general, you don't have the right to keep records secure from law enforcement if they have a warrant. If this law is passed, these companies should simply disclose to their customers that they will provide law enforcement with the means to decrypt their data, as many already do.
I also don't see how it severely undermines encryption. Yes, end-to-end encryption is more secure, but it's not the industry norm. Security is relative, but I wouldn't call Gmail "insecure" just because Google allows law enforcement to read emails with a warrant.
[1] https://www.socialaw.com/services/slip-opinions/slip-opinion...
If you can point to specific precedent that would be helpful.
I'm not sure, to be honest, but I think it's certainly a reasonable position to take.
> IANAL, but as far as I know, if the police can't physically break into your safe, there is nothing saying that they have any legal recourse to compel you to open it.
If it can be established that the safe is yours and that you possess the key or know the combination, I believe a court can indeed order you to open it or to produce the contents, punishable by contempt of court.
> Any why should it be the responsibility of the manufacturer/service provider to supply law enforcement with a key?
Because the state has a compelling public interest in ensuring that law enforcement can successfully execute lawful search warrants. The existence of indestructible safes would constitute a significant impediment to achieving that goal, so manufacturers of such safes have the responsibility of ensuring that law enforcement can access them.
I don't necessarily agree with that argument, but I don't think it's unreasonable.
From the perspective of these lawmakers, encrypted storage is like a safe. You have the right to store records in a safe to keep them away from prying eyes, but law enforcement has the right to order you to unlock that safe if they have a warrant. You have the same right to store those same records on an encrypted device, but law enforcement has the same right to order you to decrypt that device if they have a warrant.
Since people will sometimes refuse to decrypt a device, even when ordered to do so by a court, these lawmakers want to require OEMs and service providers to maintain control of the keys when they encrypt information on a user's behalf so as to increase the chances that lawful decryption can take place.
Is this a bad policy? Quite possibly. It has certain risks and makes certain tradeoffs, like any other policy. But it is arrogant to assume that anyone who supports it must be ignorant of how encryption works.