finite_depth
And as the other poster correctly guesses, this was a sarcastic reference to covid.
Oh well. Maybe when that happens.
"Azure" is an English color-word, but an English speaker recognizes "azure" as a kind of "blue". But "blue" is not a kind of "green" or a kind of "purple" or a kind of anything else. Hence, "blue" is a basic English color-word.
Typical English dialects have eleven basic color words: white, gray, black, brown, pink, red, orange, yellow, green, blue, and purple. Other color-words in English are considered variants of one of these eleven terms. That wasn't always true ("pink" is the most recent addition, dating to the early 1700s), but it's pretty well-established by modern English speakers. Other languages may make fewer distinctions (e.g. until about the last century Japanese used ao(i) as a basic color word that encompassed both blue and green, so e.g. a traffic light is aoi by tradition even though the modern word for green is midori) or more (e.g. Russian distinguishes light blue goluboi and dark blue sinii similarly to how English distinguishes red and pink). To an old Japanese speaker, blue and green were both shades of ao, and to a modern Russian speaker, goluboi is as distinct from sinii as "red" is from "pink" in English (they are not both "shades of blue" any more than pink and red are "shades of reddish" in English).
[1] https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2016/12/13/whats-on-...
[2] https://news.gallup.com/poll/328241/americans-average-weight...
Hence, in English-speaking usage, "Columbia" (with a u) is more common, as in the Columbia River or District of Columbia. But the (Spanish-speaking) South American country uses the 'o' spelling.
Carbon's chemistry comes from three major factors:
(1) It forms four bonds readily. (2) It can form double- and triple-bonds readily. (3) It bonds strongly to itself in a configuration that allows it to form long chains.
(1) is satisfied by other elements in its column on the periodic table, but silicon (the next element down in its group) and the following members (germanium, tin, and lead) fail (2) and increasingly (3). Silicon will form chains, but is reluctant to form double bonds; in general, double bonds become weaker for atoms further down the table. Silicon (and silicone, chains of Si-O bonds) are the most promising analogs but they have a lot of problems.
(2) is satisfied by most other light nonmetals, but those nonmetals mostly fail (3) and almost all fail (1).
The highly-electronegative oxygen doesn't really want to bond with itself (failing 3) and almost always takes a -2 oxidation state (failing 1).
Nitrogen actually does form four-bond atoms decently often (most notably the ammonium ion), so it somewhat satisfies (1) to some extent, but is so eager to form N2 that most polynitrogen compounds are wildly unstable to the point that "nitro" is a term even laypeople know is associated with explosives (failing 3).
Boron can form three bonds, allowing some of the complexity of (1), and will form nice polyboron compounds (3), but doesn't like forming double bonds (failing 2), and the bonds in boranes are so weak that they're mostly quite reactive (weakening 3).
Sulfur will form polysulfur chains (the most common form is an eight-membered ring), but sulfur (like its cousin oxygen) usually doesn't form more than two bonds except with extremely electronegative partners (like its effective total bond order of 3 in sulfur dioxide or 4 in sulfur trioxide).
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There's another problem here too: life is likely to form out of common elements in its environment, and carbon is just WAY more common than the alternatives. The mechanisms by which the elements are formed in stars very strongly favors elements with even atomic numbers (because they are mostly formed from helium-4 nuclei) and the burning processes peak at carbon/oxygen, neon, magnesium, and silicon.
As a result, carbon is very common. It's the fourth most common element in the Universe (after hydrogen, helium, and oxygen), and ~an order of magnitude more common than any of the elements discussed above except oxygen (which has basically no analogs to carbon chemistry).
A typical human cell is on the order of 10 micrometers. If you need to bridge even 1 cm of that, you're bridging ~a thousand cell-widths. If you think of a cell as the somatic equivalent of a house in a city, that's the equivalent of an infrastructure project spanning (based on a quick count of the number of houses on each block in Oakland) the equivalent of around six miles, or roughly from downtown Oakland to El Cerrito on a map of the Bay (~4 BART stations). And you have to do that on a scale where precision manufacturing is incredibly hard, where you're dealing with extremely difficult problems of chemical synthesis, in a living body, without provoking the body's defense or repair mechanisms to stop you. And that's assuming you even know what you're trying to do, which requires an understanding of the machinery of those cells that we often don't have.
It turns experiences into thoughts. It separates you from your emotions by changing your priority from experiencing, processing, and accepting your feelings to trying to analyze them. And if you, like me, are prone to mental illness, this can be devastating - because emotions often do not have a reason, especially if your brain has strong natural tendencies.
When you're depressed or anxious, sadness or anxiety form of their own accord. You can feel terrible even when things around you are good, or scared even when there is no danger. And it is very easy to get into the habit of trying to justify these feelings after the fact. When you feel sad and the world around you provides you no reason to, the justification you can give - if you're trying to rationalize your emotions - is that the problem is you, and that is an abyss you can easily find yourself trapped in.
Worse, this habit leads to you being "on the side of" those tendencies. When someone tries to help you to understand that your view of the world is skewed, your habit of justifying and rationalizing makes that feel like an attack on your reason or intelligence. You're not depressed, see, because there's this logical reason you came up with for why you feel bad. And there is always a reason you can give, a justification for why you feel bad, because life always has problems that can be invoked to explain emotions that exist in their own right. But they're not why you're miserable, they're just the reasons you give for why being miserable is rational and right. Healing from that kind of illness requires recognizing your reason and your feelings are different things with different roles, and that to try to rationalize emotion is to make a category error.
Introspection can be good, but introspection must pair with experience, not replace it. You may like such a person because her voice puts you in mind of your mother's, but that origin or association is usually not what is important - the fact that you like them is. You may like the walk because you had a lovely day on it once, but what matters is that the walk brings you joy. The analysis is useful largely when your emotions misguide you ("I keep getting into bad relationships because they draw from X emotional weakness", for example), but even then, you want to feel your feelings even if you do not let them guide your beliefs. When I'm in a depressive episode, I can't not feel bad, but what I can do is recognize that my negative feelings are not truths about the world, so that they do not poison me into a factual belief that things can never improve. When I'm anxious, I can't not feel the fear, but I can recognize that it's not a sign of real danger and that I may need to endure it to make some personal progress. These things aren't about rational understanding of my emotions, they're about a recognition that I do not and cannot control them, only how I respond to them.
I tend to think this sort of thing is a pretty big "original sin" of Anglo-American (or perhaps more generally Protestant?) culture. It arises in a kind of guilt-based virtue ethics, one that I think was originally religious, that tells us that our moral value comes from our impulses and drives, not from what we choose to do with them. It told me, in particular, that my inability to force myself to be more motivated or calm was a personal failing, not a piece of me fundamentally separate from my reason or my virtue. It tells us, as a culture, not to listen to ourselves, not to accept half of what we are, in favor of suppression and repression and self-judgement, and it leaves us as half-people as a result.
I've had nothing but positive experiences with cars in thousands of encounters over many months, but tens of thousands of people still die in accidents every year. Not observing a rare event in a small number of encounters isn't much in the way of statistical evidence.
As opposed to substack, who DEFINITELY haven't intentionally courted controversial figures. Or, as they put it:
>> Substack is already the place where independents, outsiders, nerds, contrarians, [and] deep thinkers
Read: every neoreactionary blogger who nods meaningfully in the direction of wildly racist pseudoscience because the man won't let you discuss how black people are stupid and that's why racial bias is good actually. Because that is the type that takes over every look-how-contrarian-we-are pseudo-libertarian-intellectual space.
The proper comparison here would be charcoal.
(Volcanic ash, on the other hand, contains common rock-forming elements: silicon, magnesium, and iron, with the proportions depending on the type of volcano.)
The other part is that trying to construct all truth from first principles is a hopeless endeavor for a single person or even a group of people. The rejection of institutional expertise - and the collective knowledge of failure modes that is embedded deep within institutions - leads to a lot of predictable failures.
Discussion is a commons. It relies on trust and symmetric cooperation. When those things are betrayed, the commons breaks down.
Yes, shockingly, people with education and expertise tend to do those things.
Why that might be is left as an exercise for the reader.
It's discussions of the form:
Doctor: Vaccines are safe and effective.
Crackpot: But Bob Jones got a vaccine and had a bad reaction!
Doctor: Yes, adverse reactions happen sometimes, but they're very rare.
Crackpot: But you can't say vaccines are safe because they could kill you.
Doctor: Very very very rarely, yes, but that risk is much smaller than the...
Crackpot: DOCTOR ADMITS VACCINES KILL
Is the covid vaccine effective at reducing the chance of contracting, and the severity of cases of, covid? Yes. And that is what vaccines typically do. As for stopping its spread: the original vaccine came very close to herd immunity against Alpha, yes. What it didn't stop (but did mitigate) was Delta, which evaded some of the proteins it targeted and which was so much more contagious that even substantial protection wasn't enough for R << 1.
As for the word "vaccine": a vaccine is a deliberate exposure of the body to an infectious agent or a component of such in order to sensitize the immune system against it. The covid vaccine, which exposes the body to a protein that is a component of covid (an infectious agent) qualifies. The delivery method is novel, but the principle - using a component of an infectious agent to sensitize the immune system - is the same.
Again, "beating the experts one time" does not mean that betting against them is a good bet. For every person that fits your description there are a hundred not getting vaccinated because they've "done their research". The literal comment right below mine is some anti-vax nonsense right here on HN, in a community that is overwhelmingly better-educated than the public at large.
Places with populations that shut up and listened suppressed covid nearly entirely until the rise of the much-more-contagious Delta and Omicron, neither of which would have realistically arisen at all if the whole world had applied suppression of that magnitude. New Zealand, Australia, Japan, Korea, and China remained open for business throughout most of the pandemic precisely because they had strong institutions and because they successfully enforced expert consensus.
Even within the US, the map of covid deaths is practically an electoral map, which is itself practically a map of trust in institutions. San Francisco had a death rate of 134 per 100k. King County (Seattle), 158. And less you think it's an urban/rural thing, rural Vermont sits in the 150s. Meanwhile, almost nowhere in the South or Great Plains is below 400 per 100k, and almost everywhere that is is a blue island amidst a sea of red. Raleigh-Durham, Atlanta, Austin, Dallas, Houston, Chicago, and St. Louis are all visible clear as day on a map of death rates.
Even if we assume that expert consensus got covid's origins wrong - a fact that is far from demonstrated - I will happily take a temporary error in a relatively unimportant fact about the virus' origins over hundreds of thousands of unnecessary deaths and years of shutdowns that could have been avoided with better coordination any day. Experts are sometimes wrong, but from an outside-view, probabilistic standpoint, a person betting against expert consensus is almost always going to lose, especially if they are not themselves an expert.