dudehere
Their values are incompatible with LG, and all what's left similar is the external part of letting download books, without which there would be nothing useful to look at.
Yeah, and the herculean work is actually done outside such aggregators by myriads of smaller collections, digitizing, binding, processing, collecting, and channeling millions of handmade books into rivers of literature, for free and ready to grab. The growth is global and isn't relevant to what the forks do.
Sorry to tell.
Multiple things make IPFS a more architecture-oriented solution than application-oriented BitTorrent.
There are various application features yet holding back BitTorrent and LG will utilize them in future.
It is not less secure since there's no equivalent more secure option. Don't mix problems of your network access with global decentralization. Decentralization alone is a way for better security by obscurity, but you should appreciate that whoever makes the project are volunteers having scarce resource and who don't want to make it a job for making it perfect for infinitesimal concerns.
I have no idea what "original" you refer to in this context. If the Web is more secure with broken HTTPS here and there and fully centralized access, you probably didn't fully understand what the dWeb project is doing.
Everybody who makes a contribution, even a smaller one, no need to make revolutions every day, directly affects the civilization through Library Genesis. LG is built of contributions in the same way as our body is made of cells. It's our heritage.
LG should fit in the abyss for the poor, but let the business evolve. A rebalancing from the legal entities will be required, but then a global balance can be established. Even widely known, it should take its place, and businesses their place. The two sides aren't mutually exclusive, but rather complementary.
Business cannot offer what LG does, and in this frame it is pointless to battle LG.
... using multiple free opportunities (accounts)...
Papers are distributed with IP-addresses stamped in many pdf files upon their downloading from publishers, and nobody seems discussing it. This is incomparably more harmful than some random MITM somewhere done by someone and requiring an infrastructure invasion. But even this has not yet posed a real threat.
BitTorrent: anybody directly intercepts the IP-addresses of seeders, and again, no much worry. No need to hack in as with MITM, it's just yours, go watch.
So, no problem with MITM in this project, at all. People who want to steel the projects reputation or name, simply squat domains or make various groups.
In my opinion MITM is no much different from intercepting a phone conversation by connecting to physical wires going to your apartment. It's very localized.
About MITM I'd like to add that this event is an exception even for a single person, since (the same) MITM cannot occur on different millions of network we all randomly switch. Anybody would see that the target site doesn't behave as normal at some point, should such an event happen.
Indeed, malicious networks exist and the key points here about them would be: 1) the current libgen.crypto implementation is read-only and doesn't request anything of value to be transmitted over the network; 2) your personal visiting statistics would quickly reveal, if MITM attack occurred. Eventually MITM is not more than site defacing. It's not going to be unnoticed in a read-only project, if starts behaving suspeceously.
Everyone knows what results to expect from LG (remember, the original LG project sets reputation and ethics as the top priority), there should be no issue to simply stop browsing.
Also, to avoid local network tricks (which can be very harmful), use VPN whenever possible. Nowadays it seems to be a universal tool everybody should have.
And don't connect to random WiFi networks ever. Only to those which belong to organizations you visit and are trusted.
Your post was correct, yes, since it stems from a mere HTTP protocol observation, but it ignores why it's the only way to access for some systems with some features, and that the expected harm of it for an average individual is practically zero. All variations of LG have been running without SSL for longer than a decade globally, and no problem. So, on the practical foot it's not a concern, (take into account my other comments about various issues introducing HTTPS in every part of the system).
Let's quantify it somehow to actually see if this is a concern beyond an academic exercise:
1 user out of a million users on a million networks a year may get a wrong forward due to a MITM attack on his network and notice that it is not the site he has seen a hundred times before. The probability of such an event for an average individual is something like 0.00000000000001 per annum. I call it a practical zero.
Should one get a small permanent job servicing certification for a dozen randomly expiring systems and paying money with the risk that an expired certificate, should the person die, would practically block access to resource, to get the practical zero to real zero?
My answer would be definitely not, this would be waste of life. We all know Http has this flow, but return to that comment about using http: it actually tells you may not have access at all, if you use https (not always, though, but that comment is a hint, not a statement you don't need security). Here's the choice: access with http or secure no access via https? I think there is no real choice. Neither that comment tells you more than to remember a pattern to use with dWeb domain names which reliably works.
Summarizing, your logic is correct but not practically helpful.
Story time: about 10 years ago a forker from ebookoid came in to the LG forum and started aggressively promote his site, an LG fork, selling books, while pointing out how poor LG's security was since it had no SSL/HTTPS, and his site had it. A scammer with a legit encryption was humiliating a legit project without encryption.
I hope you get my point: don't make a storm in a glass of water, because some less knowledgeable people may take it as a real breach which it is not )
Have a glass of wine and relax. There is a long line of people to catch before you get on the list.
Real life has shown users are never hunted. Operators are, since they hold stuff. A random user out of a million of such a month on mostly a protected connection should really not think anybody will have a wish to find him. It's absolutely unfeasible and should only be mentioned as a joke.
Who knows, BitTorrent might have never fixed this without seeing how IPFS works.
1. Affiliated sites listed by bookwarrior, the Founder of LG: https://libgen.life/viewtopic.php?f=26&t=7896
2. Blockchain records viewable via blockchain explorers and similar public tools. E.g., you may check the libgen.lib record on https://peername.com/, press Whois button after the search. The Peername extension simply can't handle SSL, and EmerDNS domains such as .lib aren't yet supported on IPFS by browsers. It's being worked on, though. For now only IP address forwarding works, but you can choose another way as per below.
libgen.crypto record is googlable and can be seen on OpenSea. I'm not finding the IPFS CID, though, but .crypto does support HTTPS, and so do IPFS gateways, after which the CID takes you to the correct location. You may use https://libgen.crypto/ However, in this case there can probably still be MITM with legit SSL certificates. I'm not sure.
Concluding, if you once learn a legit blockchain domain name, you can trust it's record since the record cannot be modified without direct owner's intervention. It's cryptographically strong. It's not the case with conventional Web domains which are fundamentally rented.
This is much neater in IPFS. Files and data blocks are individually handled, and there is no situation when a hash embraces several independent file fragments. Adaptive block sizes are also supported which is extremely useful for handling such collections as LG is (however I haven't checked if it's really used at present) instead of having an extra layer of hashes to rehash files individually after the torrent hashed their chopped "tape/tar" chucks. The forced BitTorrent serialization and subsequent fixed-size chunk chopping are basically absent in IPFS. This helps structuring the search and facilitates deduplication, too, through the strict Merkel tree correspondence to files, as opposed to the randomized data chunks having a fixed size for no real necessity and meaningless hashes for wider applications.
To me these are the key aspects, even torrent bug fixes, that IPFS possesses.
3. IPFS node and gateway are different things. A gateway is vulnerable to takedowns. A node isn't nearly as vulnerable. And if you run IPFS Desktop or similar software on a VPN connection, what's really left to be afraid of, conceptually? Pretty much nothing. It may throttle the traffic a bit, but that's no problem. Pick MullVad VPN or some other like NordVPN etc. Free test days are available usually.
I don't know why exactly, but edonkey was killed by intercepting participants' IPs, but even without encryption it has not yet happened to BitTorrent. With VPN it's just unfeasible.
My browsers actually do offer to rename the files. It might be that yours is set not to prompt.
3. An arbitrary IPFS gateway can be set up our rented, it's not a taboo. They are usually $10/Mon.
The clickability problem is explained down this thread, it's the same as making an URL addressing a book. Not that nice. It's a technological peculiarity.
The naming may have a solution a bit later. It wasn't clear initially how to approach it.
Have a look what the fair use doctrine tells us https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fair_use
To access it, you need to use software given in the description