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drachir91

Re:Deep dive into the UK air traffic control meltdown on Monday September 11, 2023 @05:46PM (#37474159)
This looks to me like it could work, but would need a ready force of technicians always expecting something like that so they can troubleshoot it in a timely manner.
Re:Deep dive into the UK air traffic control meltdown on Monday September 11, 2023 @05:43PM (#37474134)
No, I do not. But HA systems work like that because hardware or network failure is what they are designed to guard against, not a latent bug in the software logic. If there's a software bug, both systems will exhibit the same behavior, so HA fails there.
Re:Deep dive into the UK air traffic control meltdown on Monday September 11, 2023 @05:35PM (#37474035)
I don't know but in recent years I'm increasingly seeing mission critical systems having only token or "apparent" rendundancies instead of real ones, and couldn't find any other rationale than cost savings and shareholder bottom lines. I'm not saying that capitalism = bad, it's mostly better than the alternatives, but just like its most direct competitor, it suffers from bad implementations across the world and unbounded human greed.

A recent and very "in the face" example, also from the air travel industry would be the B737 Max and its AoA sensors. There were two, for two flight computers, but MCAS only used 1 flight computer and 1 AoA sensor, despite the already existing crosslinks between the flight computers and the sensors...

Pofit maxing first with the "no need for a new type rating for the pilots", then cost-cutting first in aeronautical engineering (solving an airframe design problem with software, plus designing a flight envelope protection system that can overpower the human pilots).

Then cost-cutting in software engineering and QC, rushing out software made by (probably) inexperienced in the field engineers and failing to properly test it and ensure that it had the needed redundancy.

Re:Deep dive into the UK air traffic control meltdown on Monday September 11, 2023 @04:37PM (#37473344)
What ticked me is that when the primary system threw in the towel, an EXACT SAME system took over and ran the exact same code on the exact same data as the primary. I know that with code and algorithms it's not always the case but even then you know what doing the same thing over and over expecting different results defines...

Yes, it can be argued that the software should've had more graceful failure modes and this shouldn't have thrown a critical exception. It can be argued that the programmers should've seen this possibility. We can argue a lot of things about this.

But the reality is that this is a mission-critical system. And for such systems, there're ways to mitigate all of these mistakes and allow the system to continue functioning.

The easiest (but least safe) one would be to have the secondary system loaded with code that does the same thing but written by a different team/vendor. It reduces the chance from 100% to much-much less that if any input provokes an unforseen, system-breaking bug in the primary, the same input will provoke the same bug in the secondary.

An even better solution is to have a triumvirate system, where all 3 have code written by different teams, and they always compare results. If 3 agree, great, if 2 agree, not so great but safe to assume that the bug is in the 1 not the 2 (but should throw an alert for the supervisors that the whole system is in a degraded mode where any further node failure is a showstopper), and if all disagree, grind everything to a halt because the world is ending, and let the humans handle it.

It can be refined even further. And it's not something new. So why wasn't this system implemented in such a way? (Aside from cost. I don't care about anyones cost-cutting incentives in mission-critical systems. Sorry capitalism...)

Re:Deep dive into the UK air traffic control meltdown on Monday September 11, 2023 @04:12PM (#37472980)
No, waypoints aren't spelled out with the ICAO alphabet. They are mnemonics that are pronounced as a word and only spelled out if the person on the receiving end requests it because of bad radio reception, or unfamiliarity with the area/waypoint.

For example, Hungarian waypoints, at least the more important ones are normally named after cities, towns or other geographical locations near them, and use the locations name or abbreviated name, being careful that they can be pronounced reasonably easily for English speakers. Like: ERGOM (for the city Esztergom), ABONY (for the town Füzesabony), SOPRO (for Sopron), etc.