domanic
First, from Matthew Green:
> A while ago on Twitter somebody asked why I spend so much time criticizing things that are old and broken, rather than making things new and shiny. When I finished sputtering, I realized that the answer is simple: I'm lazy.
(from this blogpost: http://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2012/12/the-anatomy-... )
and the second from Diffie & Helman's classic paper, _New Directions in Cryptography_
> The last characteristic which we note in the history of cryptography is the division between amateur and professional cryptographers. Skill in production cryptanalysis has always been heavily on the side of the professionals, but innovation, particularly in the design of new types of cryptographic systems, has come primarily from the amateurs.
(from: http://www.cs.jhu.edu/~rubin/courses/sp03/papers/diffie.hell...)
(note that "cryptanalysis" means _breaking cryptographic systems_)
(Also, I was not aware of noise so thank you for bringing that to my attention!)
You could use this protocol for the rest of the tcp connection, once a forward secure key has been agreed upon.
To clarify: this is not a substitute for TLS, DTLS, Curvecp, or Noise-Pipes -- because there is no key agreement handshake.
You could use this with a suitable handshake protocol to encrypt the rest of the session, or you could encrypt a file.
Do not use this protocol on it's own to encrypt a tcp connection. I have updated the protocols documentation to make this more clear.
You ask a good question, but I would much rather discuss it on github, since then that discussion will be tied to the project not a hacker news thread.