aubreyclayton
A better example is this: suppose you're creating a probabilistic forecast of the chance of a coin coming up Heads twice. Suppose this represents a win. You say, "according to my model, P[H1 and H2] = 0.3." And suppose you also say P[H1] = 0.4
Then I ask you: imagining the first flip comes up Heads, what will your price for the second Heads be then? The only arbitrage-free price you can quote me is your conditional probability: P[H2 | H1] = P[H1 and H2]/P[H1] = 0.75. Anything else allows me to buy and sell bets and make a riskless profit.
Now, note that if H1 occurs, P[H2 | H1] is now the updated chance of getting H1 and H2. You observed some information and updated your probability accordingly. Also note that according to your model, the chance of H1 happening was 0.4, so the possible prices of "H1 and H2" after one coin flip were 0.75 with probability 0.4 and 0 with probability 0.6 (if the first flip were tails, "H1 and H2" is impossible). So the expected price of "H1 and H2" after one flip is (.75)(.4) + (0)(.6) = 0.3, which is also your price at t=0. That means the probability/price is a martingale according to your probability assignments, which, according to the Fundamental Theorem of Asset Pricing, again means no arbitrage is possible, unless we disagree on what events have probability zero.
So, the election forecasts are like this except we don't get to see all the inner workings. Nate doesn't quote things like the probability of the polls moving by a certain amount each day. We just get to see things like P[H1 and H2] before and after the first coin flip. But as long as it's possible that those come from a consistent set of conditional probabilities and Bayesian updating, there's no chance for arbitrage.
If that's foreign to you, you might be interested in this write-up I did about election-forecasting in which I considered the same example, just in discrete time rather than continuous time: http://nautil.us/issue/70/variables/how-to-improve-political...
The basic idea is that if you increase the volatility of a random-walk process, say by making the step-sizes larger, that won't actually make the probability of finishing above where you started any less (or more) volatile. The higher volatility means that from any given starting point your final resting place is more dispersed, but you're also more likely to range farther from home as you go. The two effects exactly cancel. Taleb's critique misses the second part of that.
What I'm addressing here is Taleb's claim that Silver's probabilities would allow for arbitrage (i.e., riskless profit, not just profit on average) if turned into betting prices. This is in the sense of arbitrage-through-time, buying low and then selling high. As I discussed in the piece, an old argument due to de Finetti says that if prices are arbitrage-free they must satisfy the equations of probability, meaning you can in some sense think of the price as giving a probability of the outcome. For time-dynamic arbitrage the relevant equation is Bayes' Theorem. All I meant by my statement above is that the converse to de Finetti's argument is also true, trivially. If prices obey the equations of probability they are automatically arbitrage-free. And since Silver's probabilities begin life as probabilities, they satisfy all the relevant equations (one would expect).
Technically, the way we'd express this in modern finance is through the Fundamental Theorem of Asset Pricing, which says a (complete) market is arbitrage-free if and only if there exists an equivalent measure under which asset prices are martingales. Silver's probabilities are necessarily martingales, just because of the way conditional probability math works, so unless Taleb can claim that his and Silver's probabilities aren't equivalent, meaning they disagree on what events have probability zero, then there is no chance of arbitrage. That's just the mathy way of saying the same thing I said in the post.
There are many other possible errors Silver could be making, and many other possible criticisms Taleb could have made but did not. In this case he wrote a paper claiming a mathematical result that just isn't true.
Hope that's helpful!