ariadneconill
The security tracker is a tool for the security team to remediate vulnerabilities.
The data provided by it is not particularly useful nor intended for consumption by people other than the security team and alpine package maintainers: it generates reports for possible CVEs to review and possibly mitigate in the package collection. The presence of data in the tracker that is not present in the secdb (either as an ACK or NAK) is just an indication that there is a vulnerability to investigate, not that anything has been confirmed or denied. Really, the data is not relevant as a product for end users to consume.
The secdb outlines what package versions fix what CVEs, and what CVEs have been formally NAKed. Speculative data from a distribution-wide vulnerability scanning tool is not useful data to be making security-related decisions with.
But we heard overwhelming demand for glibc support from customers. So we built a companion distribution for customers who needed to run GNU/Linux workloads, but still wanted to leverage the advantages of Alpine.
Secondly, the issue you opened was against an internal project used by the security team to do continuous CVE triage of the distribution. It is not meant to be used for public security data. We are tired of security vendors scraping our internal tool, as generating those reports in real time is very expensive on resources.
For public security data, you can use the secdb: https://secdb.alpinelinux.org/
No, it's not OVAL, but we would accept patches to generate an OVAL feed as well.
Same reason why I did not mention the Pine64 stuff: I don’t own any of it.
You ignore the point I am making: people are already fighting this issue for years, and Alpine has not taken a position on it until now.
We should have done so sooner, but unfortunately we did not, so a more theatric approach is sometimes needed to make a point.
We want to discourage bad practices in the creation of alpine-based images, so that our partners (such as the Docker library team) do not have to deal with user complaints with images, or feel like companies are bullying them into accepting images they know are built with bad practices.
If you call taking action to provide assistance requested by our ecosystem partners (who have been thrilled that we are putting our foot down by the way) toxic behavior I wouldn’t want to know what your idea of a party is to be blunt.
The problem is that third parties take his package and then describe the combination of Alpine with his package in such a way that people are led to believe is totally stock Alpine.
This then causes many people to complain in Alpine support channels, or on websites like this one, that Alpine is "buggy" in ways that cannot be reproduced on real Alpine.
You also assume that this is our first reaction.
Our first reaction was 6 years ago when it first came out: meh.
No, this is our first reaction to a large company trying to pass off their hackjob images combining Alpine, glibc and a glibc JDK as a certified JDK that is running on stock Alpine.
It is unfortunate that we have waited this long to put our foot down, honestly!
We need to support our friends in the Docker community who manage the Docker Library who also get to deal with the fallout of these hackjob images.
The person who makes the hackjob rarely faces the consequences of it breaking, that basically has always fallen on us, or on the Docker Library team, or on some other team in the ecosystem that has to deal with somebody who is mad because their application has failed due to some shoddy work done by somebody 2 years ago.
Stop assuming this is our "first" reaction. It isn't. I even said it wasn't to begin with -- a "first" reaction cannot logically be an escalation from a previous position, it must be an initial one.
Whether it gets documented as part of a "don't do weird things" system or this update gets accepted, it needs to be addressed, as people have erroneously expected this configuration to have the same stability guarantees as stock Alpine.
Sasha's package is not the problem, it is the third-party distributors who distribute the final result as an "alpine" image, which leads people to believe that everything is legit about it.
Do you not think that distributions should make even a little bit of effort to introduce friction toward scenarios known to break systems?
If apk-tools had a soft conflict option, where it printed a warning and required the user to acknowledge that warning somehow before continuing, that would also solve the issue as far as I am concerned, but it does not have such an option at this time, and we need to put our foot down sooner rather than later.
Edit: besides, nothing has been implemented. This is just one proposal, the point of having a conversation is to determine what the best option for solving this issue is.
and, the conflict option is one of a few options being considered. part of what lead up to this is the fact that we have not taken any public position on mixing glibc and musl runtimes until now.
no decision has been made, and won't be made until the TSC meeting next week...
it's not like we are blocking it in apk-tools, and you can roll your own musl package with the conflict removed by simply building it with the `ALLOW_GLIBC_PKG` option.
Storing small data, like function-local ints, pointers, etc, on the stack is beneficial due to L1$ prefetching semantics, but storing a 512KB scratchpad on the stack (which is what the article is about) will totally trash your L1$ and you'll have MORE cache misses than you would if that scratchpad was not on the stack.