Natanael
Re:What's wrong with in-browser cryptography?
on Wednesday January 01, 2014 @11:55AM (#6995463)
The main reason for that is that software very rarely is properly sandboxed by default.
Re:Bitmessage – Send messages without leaking metadata
on Saturday December 07, 2013 @07:06PM (#6868335)
The addresses is a hash of a public key, not a public key itself.
Re:Bitmessage – Send messages without leaking metadata
on Saturday December 07, 2013 @07:02PM (#6868322)
Which is why we need to get it studied more.
Re:Bitmessage – Send messages without leaking metadata
on Saturday December 07, 2013 @06:59PM (#6868314)
I've never had problems with receiving messages with it. Had I2P been running for at least 20 minutes or so to be able to establish enough connections? Bote can tell you how many Bote nodes it is connected to.
Re:Bitmessage – Send messages without leaking metadata
on Saturday December 07, 2013 @03:47PM (#6867613)
@synctext: you can't have traffic anonymity without routing. And I2P is mainly slow because the shared bandwidth is low.
Also, it isn't a hard as you claim. It is mainly a matter of setup.
Re:Bitmessage – Send messages without leaking metadata
on Saturday December 07, 2013 @02:23PM (#6867310)
Doesn't I2P fit better, considering the design requirements? Tor would require very significant changes to scale better for high volume traffic, but I2P already handles it reasonably well.
Re:Bitmessage – Send messages without leaking metadata
on Saturday December 07, 2013 @02:18PM (#6867290)
What do you think of Bote mail in I2P, which uses DHT for relaying mail? It is set to hold mail in the DHT for 100 days or until fetched by the recipient. It also uses public keys as addresses (ECDSA and NTRU are the options), and all mail is encrypted. I2P provides traffic anonymization, and Bote mail supports letting mails be relayed with random delays to further anonymize the sender by removing time correlation.
https://www.i2p2.de and http://i2pbote.i2p.us (remove .us if you have I2P installed).
Re:Service lets you "certify" a document using the Bitcoin blockchain
on Friday December 06, 2013 @01:59PM (#6862887)
5460 satoshis is the current default minimum that Bitcoin itself allows (other transactions are valid, but won't be forwarded, thus you need to hand it over to a miner yourself for inclusion in a block).
Re:Bruce Schneier has changed his PGP key to 4096 bits
on Saturday September 14, 2013 @09:34AM (#6385506)
Some allow larger keys. I once generated an 8192 bit key. It took a loooong time. Never used it. I guess that piece of software would have allowed 16k keys too.
Re:Bruce Schneier has changed his PGP key to 4096 bits
on Saturday September 14, 2013 @09:29AM (#6385496)
> If you don't trust Gmail, you shouldn't trust it any less if/when they deploy PGP for it.
The problem here might be that people (including Google, I guess) don't want users to trust anything MORE THAN THEY SHOULD, which is a major risk in a case like this. Sometimes security features can be counterproductive since they can lead to the users making bad assumptions and therefore bad decisions that they otherwise wouldn't have made. PGP in webmail implemented just in JS is likely one of these things that could make things worse due to how users treat them.