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Lery

Re:How to defeat Ed25519 and EdDSA using faults on Friday October 06, 2017 @11:18AM (#15417445)
When signing the same message, all EdDSA implementations are supposed to reuse the same `r`, as per RFC 8032, and thus to produce the same signature under the same key. For smartphone and instant messaging, I wouldn't be worried about fault attacks, there are probably easier ways around it.
Re:How to defeat Ed25519 and EdDSA using faults on Friday October 06, 2017 @11:15AM (#15417420)
You seems to have read the second paper which got published on the same topic shortly after this work was presented at FDTC. However both papers are about the same kind of fault attacks. And since you mention playing around, the first paper and the blog post here also provide some python code for you to play with bit flips.

Regarding the IOT setup, I know first hand that Nest products are trying very hard to be secure even in case of physical possession. Especially on the firmware signature verification part. But they rely on some fun post-quantum scheme, not on EdDSA.

It's true that in the end it all boils down to your threat model, but I bet smartcard producers are glad someone researched this before they got on the EdDSA train.

Re:How to defeat Ed25519 and EdDSA using faults on Friday October 06, 2017 @04:22AM (#15415210)
You don't really want to verify the signature you've just generated, if you care about perf, because verification is twice as costly as signing.