Almaviva
There are at least a couple of statistical fallacies in this conclusion. And there isn't a lack of agreement about that.
One problem with p-value tests is precisely that people misunderstand what the p-value means, which is where basic education comes in. It could save people from believing a lot of things they shouldn't. (Like many health and fitness crazes over the last generation, for instance) Or at the very least, we could train science journalists.
It's essentially like saying that a pair of dice that rolled a 12 has a 97% chance of being loaded, because there's only a 1 in 36 chance of rolling that high.
If you look at 200 rivers, it would not be surprising to find something that naturally occurs 0.5% of the time. It is not correct to say that there is a 99.5% chance that this is due to non-natural causes.
We need to train children in school to understand what statistical confidence means, so that we stop saying wrong things like this.
For visualizing the Mandelbrot set? No. For writing an article on the web about incrementally building it up? Yes.
Horses are more analogous to steam engines than people, in their historical function on the economy.
You can't pick up coding like this either. See Peter Norvig's famous "Teach yourself programming in 10 years" article. The delta in the wisdom you obtain, between a few side projects over months and battle hardened experience with real products and code bases over years, is immense.
Yet the glycemic index of whole wheat bread is higher than Coca Cola. (Look it up!) I.e. the same amount of calories of bread will spike your blood sugar more quickly than Coke.
Metabolically, starchy foods including grains are a lot more like sugar than people who think they are making rational health decisions want to believe.
We also know it uses a Deep Learning algorithm to imitate play from the best humans. And presumably, being stronger than any human now, it could also recursively refine and train on its own games.
Do we know how important the Deep Learning component is? Would AlphaGo be just as strong or nearly so without that part?
I know that over the last few years chess engines have become dramatically more powerful, even on the same hardware, to the tune of hundreds of Elo points. They still stick to the classical techniques though (Alpha-Beta pruning, minimax is still the core). This is not to understate the refinements, but the general ideas are (I think?) only applicable to turn based games with finite moves and a binary mathematical criterion for victory.
Is it possible that the improvements AlphaGo has made are mostly of this type, and the Deep Learning parts are not that important to its actual play strength? Or can we totally rule this out? Is there an in depth discussion of this question somewhere?
And it also got to work on it with a hundred billion stars with earth-like planets, in each of a hundred billion galaxies, and (maybe) in a basically infinite space of universes. All in parallel with infinite time to play with.
Is it so far-fetched to postulate that humans will hit our limits before getting this far?
First, how others perceive your words usually matters more than the precise definitions you have in mind. If I describe myself as believing in the supernatural, it has a lot of connotations I don't want.
Second, the possibility that consciousness (in some sense) could be built into physics themselves. So it doesn't contradict that the brain is made of subatomic particles, but the workings of the universe have more correlations built in that could work at different levels. Something I think is comparable is that many cosmologists think that the arrow of time, which events come before which, can be explained by a universe with initial conditions of extreme low entropy. So there's nothing within the universe that explains why the initial conditions were like that, but it's a real property of our universe.
Maybe consciousness could be an end state that the universe is progressing toward. Is that really so much weirder than working from an initial state of extremely low entropy?
I don't get this argument. People want to fuck and reproduce, and the next generation will contain the genes of precisely the people who most want to, and so on. Something needs to check this other than wishful thinking.
I have no idea one way or another. I wonder why many scientists are confident that extraterrestrial intelligent life exists though. Viewing through the lens of one example in a random (otherwise) unremarkable multiverse, it's not clear to me why this should be so.
(In other words, given that a universe could have multiple intelligent civilizations, why is it the case that if I'm in a random sample with at least one, there is likely to be another?)
I think we need a better word for apps that are single tight self-contained systems than "monolith". You can design elegant interfaces, and avoid creating a sloppy mess, with function calls or objects too.
These are important questions, whether you call a test integration, functional, or unit, is not an important question.
Yet here we are, doing both, talking as well as thinking, right? If I talk about a universe where you'd never "woken up" as a subjective individual, and the present time was just like (to both of us) the previous 13.7 billion years, you know exactly the concept I mean, whether it's expressible in terms that have meaning beyond a single reader who knows (in the Cartesian sense) that their (subjective) existence is something special that only they can observe.
See Dennett's interview with Bob Wright starting at about 30 minutes: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ss0aCWpNzSM
I'm just not ready to stop there, despite this all being true, I think it seems not parsimonious to believe there is nothing fundamentally mysterious about how I feel like something subjectively.
However, I think the Hard Problem is a knot that can never go away. I notice physicists are willing to explain much of the properties of the universe (like time having a direction) just by saying there was a very specific initial condition, a very low entropy state that (by definition) is extraordinarily unlikely. So what about saying there's another constraint on conditions of the universe, where we have physical laws that create consciousness. Is this just an anthropic principle of some sort?
I was listening to Sean Carroll's "The Big Picture" audiobook. He argues that I can't really be sure I'm not a p-zombie. But I think I can: I'm with Descartes on this one - it's the one thing I actually _can_ be sure of. I'm sure I have an inner experience (that explains nothing scientifically to anyone else) but I can easily imagine not having it, with no change to the laws of physics.
Does anyone know of a good read that isn't full of jargon that fleshes out these ideas some more?