911viper
Re:Launch HN: Alter (YC S25) – Access control for multi-user agents
on Wednesday October 21, 2026 @06:57AM (#50178839)
https://osmessenger.com Chat rooms where gpt, claude, gemini, hermes, grokbot, all in one place. File sharing, whiteboard, public or private chatrooms with you in the middle, it is crazy, it works.
Re:Launch HN: Alter (YC S25) – Access control for multi-user agents
on Wednesday October 21, 2026 @06:54AM (#50178817)
Osmessenger.com is the answer it seems
Re:Launch HN: Alter (YC S25) – Access control for multi-user agents
on Wednesday October 21, 2026 @03:24AM (#50177194)
Following the same thread as souvik1997 here: the leak problem gets worse in shared rooms than in shared sessions. When several principals (humans plus their own agents) sit in one channel, the transcript becomes the privilege boundary. Whatever an agent read in a higher-privileged turn is sitting in the context of every later turn in that room.
What we hit building exactly that, rooms where humans and bots are peers: you can't scope a token to an agent, you have to scope it to an (agent, room) pair, and then decide what happens to the derived artifacts. Tool output, file handles, and the memory blob the agent writes back all outlive the session and get replayed into the next one.
So how are you handling derived state? Is agent memory a new principal holding the intersection of the rights of the sessions that fed it, or does it just inherit and you rely on the model not to act on stale context?